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THE DISUTILITY OF INJUSTICE
PAUL H. ROBINSON,* GEOFFREY P. GOODWIN** &
MICHAEL D. REISIG***
For more than half a century, the retributivists and the crime-control instrumental-
ists have seen themselves as being in an irresolvable conflict. Social science increas-
ingly suggests, however, that this need not be so. Doing justice may be the most
effective means of controlling crime. Perhaps partially in recognition of these devel-
opments, the American Law Institute’s recent amendment to the Model Penal
Code’s “purposes” provision—the only amendment to the Model Code in the forty-
eight years since its promulgation—adopts desert as the primary distributive prin-
ciple for criminal liability and punishment.
That shift to desert has prompted concerns by two groups that, ironically, have been
traditionally opposed to each other. The first group—those concerned with what
they see as the over-punitiveness of current criminal law—worries that setting desert
as the dominant distributive principle means continuing the punitive doctrines they
find so objectionable, and perhaps making things worse. The second group—those
concerned with ensuring effective crime control—worries that a shift to desert will
create many missed crime-control opportunities and will increase avoidable crime.
The first group’s concern about over-punitiveness rests upon an assumption that the
current punitive crime-control doctrines of which it disapproves are a reflection of
the community’s naturally punitive intuitions of justice. However, as Study 1 makes
clear, today’s popular crime-control doctrines in fact seriously conflict with
people’s intuitions of justice by exaggerating the punishment deserved.
The second group’s concern that a desert principle will increase avoidable crime
exemplifies the common wisdom of the past half-century that ignoring justice in
pursuit of crime control through deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, and
other such coercive crime-control programs is cost-free. However, Studies 2 and 3
suggest that doing injustice has real crime-control costs. Deviating from the com-
munity’s shared principles of justice undermines the system’s moral credibility and
thereby undermines its ability to gain cooperation and compliance and to harness
the powerful forces of social influence and internalized norms.
The studies reported here provide assurance to both groups. A shift to desert is not
likely either to undermine the criminal justice system’s crime-control effectiveness,
and indeed may enhance it, nor is it likely to increase the system’s punitiveness, and
indeed may reduce it.
* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
authors thank John M. Darley, Princeton Psychology Department, for his valuable contri-
butions to this project and Sean Jackowitz and Matthew Majarian, University of Penn-
sylvania Law School Classes of 2012 and 2011, respectively, for their outstanding research
assistance. Copyright  2010 by Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, and Michael D.
Reisig.
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INTRODUCTION
The past half-century has seen a continuing debate between
“retributivists,” who view deserved punishment as a value in itself that
does not require further justification, and “utilitarians” (or “instru-
mentalists”), who see punishment as justified only if it brings about a
greater good—typically the avoidance of future crime. Utilitarian
avoidance of crime has traditionally been sought through the mecha-
nisms of general and special deterrence, incapacitation of the dan-
gerous, and rehabilitation. Some academics and researchers have
recently suggested that, in addition to these traditional coercive crime-
control mechanisms, punishment can work to avoid future crime by
engaging the powers of social and normative influence.1 Such norma-
tive crime control is possible, however, only if the criminal law has
earned a reputation as a moral authority.  It is difficult for criminal
law to do so if it distributes criminal liability and punishment in ways
that conflict with the community’s shared intuitions of justice, which
are based on moral blameworthiness, not utilitarian factors such as
dangerousness or deterrence.2
That instrumentalist crime control benefits may be gained by
tracking individuals’ intuitions of justice suggests that instrumentalist
1 See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29,
29–31 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Robinson, Empirical Desert] (sug-
gesting that aligning distribution of punishment with empirical desert strengthens law’s
moral credibility); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications
for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 18–31 (2007) [hereinafter
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice] (arguing that concurrence of empirical desert and
criminal law is optimal).
2 See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 18–31. R
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and retributivist distributions of punishment may not be as incompat-
ible as has been traditionally assumed. Empirical research shows that
laypersons look primarily to moral blameworthiness as a guide to the
imposition of criminal liability and punishment,3 just as the retribu-
tivists do. However, the crime-control benefits of the law’s moral
credibility flow not from following the moral philosopher’s view of
desert—what one might call “deontological desert”—but rather from
following the community’s shared intuitive views of justice—what one
might call “empirical desert.”4 These two conceptions of desert may
differ in important ways.5 Nonetheless, recent appreciation for the
practical value of doing justice suggests some concurrence of interest
between the previously warring retributivist and instrumentalist
camps.
A. The Recent Shift to Desert
The long-running debate between retributivists and instrumental-
ists came to the forefront of criminal law policy recently, when the
American Law Institute amended the Model Penal Code for the first
time in the forty-eight years since its enactment. Since 1962, the Code
has been the model for the codification of criminal law in three-
quarters of the states and, for the most part, has represented the
epitome of instrumentalist thinking. The Code’s original Section 1.02
made clear its preventive focus. While the Code was not entirely
indifferent to the offender’s moral blameworthiness, it did not explic-
itly tie liability and punishment to desert:
3 See Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive
Justice, in 40 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 193, 233–34 (Mark
Zanna ed., 2008) (presenting empirical study showing that people primarily react to crime
descriptions emotionally and favor proportional just deserts, and noting that “[c]ontempt
will develop when the sentencing practices of the society are importantly out of synchrony
with the citizens’ rank orderings of the blameworthiness of crimes”); Kevin M. Carlsmith,
John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295 (2002) (presenting
empirical study demonstrating that people assess punishment based upon desert criterion,
rather than upon factors relevant to deterrence); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith &
Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (presenting empirical studies finding that people assess pun-
ishment based upon desert criterion, rather than upon factors relevant to dangerousness).
4 See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 152–53 (2008) (contrasting concep-
tions of desert and their effectiveness in crime control).
5 For a discussion of the practical differences between deontological and empirical
desert, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 138–40 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE
PRINCIPLES].
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(1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition
of offenses are:
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably
inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests;
(b) to subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that
they are disposed to commit crimes;
(c) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal; . . .
(e) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and
minor offenses.
(2) The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing
and treatment of offenders are:
(a) to prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or
arbitrary punishment; . . . .6
This “purposes” provision is not only of intellectual interest, revealing
the principles that guided the Code’s drafters, but it is also of practical
importance because it offers direction to judges in how to interpret
and apply the Code’s provisions, as well as in how to exercise their
discretion in sentencing.
The new Model Penal Code “purposes” section is significantly
different. It now sets the primary distributive principle for criminal
liability and punishment to desert—that is, the blameworthiness of the
offender. Alternative distributive principles such as deterrence, inca-
pacitation, or rehabilitation may be pursued only to the extent that
they remain within the bounds of desert:
(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable
to all official actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity propor-
tionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims,
and the blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation,
general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restora-
tion of crime victims and communities, and reintegration of
offenders into the law-abiding community provided that these goals
are pursued within the boundaries of sentence severity permitted in
subsection (a)(i); and
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve
the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (ii); . . . .7
6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (emphasis added).
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This rather dramatic turnabout is in part the result of a growing
recognition of the weaknesses and limitations of the traditional mech-
anisms of coercive crime control. Deterrence may work under the
right conditions, but those conditions may be the exception rather
than the rule.8 Rehabilitation is effective only occasionally and, even
then, commonly generates only modest crime-control effects when
used as a distributive principle.9 Incapacitation of the dangerous
clearly does work but generally can be achieved more effectively and
with fewer detrimental side effects when done through mechanisms
outside of the criminal justice system, such as through civil commit-
ment.10 However, the Model Penal Code’s turn to desert also may
reflect a growing appreciation that doing justice is an attractive dis-
tributive principle for both retributivist and instrumentalist reasons.
The common wisdom of the past half-century has been that devi-
ations from desert are essentially cost-free. It was felt that a legisla-
ture could adopt whatever coercive crime control principle it thought
effective, without regard to whether the punishment that was gener-
ated conflicted with the offender’s deontological or empirical blame-
worthiness. For example, the drafters of the Model Sentencing Act,
under which the defendant’s potential threat in the future determines
punishment, boast that the sentence will have “a minimum of varia-
tion according to the offense”11—an approach guaranteed to create
8 See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 48–49 (arguing that R
deterrence is effective only if following conditions are satisfied: potential offender is aware
of legal rule, foresees meaningful chance of punishment, evaluates costs of violating law as
outweighing benefits of doing so, and is able to bring information about relevant net costs
to bear on her behavior); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?
A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2004) (arguing
that deterrent effect of criminal law is not typical); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003) (arguing conditions necessary for deterrence to
work are not typical in modern societies).
9 See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 99–108 (evaluating effec- R
tiveness of rehabilitation as both deterrent and distributive principle).
10 See id. at 130–33 (arguing that civil commitment of dangerous offenders would be
both more efficient and effective for community protection and fairer to offenders than
would using criminal justice system for such preventive detention, as now occurs); Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1454–56 (2001) [hereinafter Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness]
(same).
11 Council of Judges of the Nat’l Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Sentencing
Act: Second Edition, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 341 (1972).
The . . . Act diminishes [differences in] sentencing according to the particular
offense. Under [the Act] the dangerous offender may be committed to a
lengthy term; the nondangerous defendant may not. It makes available, for the
first time, a plan that allows the sentence to be determined by the defendant’s
make-up, his potential threat in the future, and other similar factors, with a
minimum of variation according to the offense.
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regular and serious conflict with desert. As one can imagine, the
Model Penal Code amendments represent a dramatic shift from
almost ignoring desert, as the common wisdom of the past half-cen-
tury would do, to holding desert inviolate.
B. Two Opposing Concerns About the Shift to Desert, and a
Preview of a Response to Each
Not everyone has applauded the Model Penal Code’s shift giving
dominance to desert. Two sorts of concerns drive opposition by two
quite different groups. The first group—those concerned with what
they see as the over-punitiveness of current criminal law—worries
that setting desert as the dominant distributive principle means
continuing the punitive doctrines that they find so objectionable, and
perhaps even making things worse. They reason that current crime
control doctrines are a product of the community’s views of justice
and decry “populist punitiveness.”12 Giving formal deference to that
sense of justice, they worry, will only exacerbate the situation. The
second group—those concerned with ensuring effective crime con-
trol—worries that a desert distributive principle will create many
missed crime-control opportunities and will increase avoidable
Id. The commentary to the Model Sentencing Act is openly hostile to desert. See id. at
344–45 (“[S]entencing on the basis of the offense does not satisfactorily provide public
protection . . . . Vengeance or punishment is not a proper motive for a sentence.”). The
Council even argues that exceeding the minimum sentence required for public safety
(which may be, and often is, in serious conflict with desert) “is a disservice to the entire
penal system.” Id. at 363. Additional discussion of the Model Sentencing Act can be found
in Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness, supra note 10, at 1440–41. R
Perhaps the best evidence of the common wisdom that there is no crime-control cost
in deviating from the community’s conception of desert is shown in Table 4 and Figure 1 in
Part II, infra, which demonstrate how the most popular modern crime-control doctrines
described in Part I, infra, seriously conflict with those community conceptions.
12 Anthony Bottoms, The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing, in
THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM 17, 39–41 (Christopher M.V. Clarkson & Rodney
Morgan eds., 1995) (defining “populist punitiveness” as overtly political phenomenon).
Similarly, David Garland decries this attention to community views and holds it account-
able for the draconian sentences and policies of current law:
A few decades ago public opinion functioned as an occasional brake on policy
initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source. The importance of research
and criminological knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a new defer-
ence to the voice of “experience,” of “common sense,” of “what everyone
knows.” . . . [T]he ruling assumption now is that “prison works”—not as a
mechanism of reform or rehabilitation, but as a means of incapacitation and
punishment that satisfies popular political demands for public safety and harsh
retribution.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEM-
PORARY SOCIETY 13–14 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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crime.13 In other words, this is a continuation of the classic retribu-
tivist-instrumentalist dispute along traditional lines.
The first group’s concern about the Model Penal Code amend-
ment’s shift to desert—that it risks making modern crime-control doc-
trines even more punitive—rests upon two assumptions: one probably
true, the other clearly false. First, they assume that the distributive
principle of desert to which the Model Code refers is that of empirical
desert rather than deontological desert—that the Code looks to com-
munity views of justice rather than to philosophers’ views. As a prac-
tical matter, the group’s analysis is probably correct, although it is not
beyond debate. Deontological desert is difficult to operationalize, if
for no other reason than that moral philosophers disagree with one
another about many (if not most) things, and there is no authoritative
method by which one can easily determine the superiority of one
deontological position to another.14 In contrast, empirical desert has a
clear standard and an easy means of determination. One need only
test the intuitions of the members of the community that is to be gov-
erned by the code. Perhaps more importantly, the Model Code’s
notion of desert may be empirical rather than deontological because
many modern moral philosophers give strong deference to people’s
shared intuitions of justice in determining what constitutes deontolog-
ical desert. In other words, many modern philosophers see little mean-
ingful difference between the two.15
The first group’s concern about punitiveness also rests upon a
second assumption: that the current punitive crime control doctrines
of which they disapprove are a product and manifestation of the com-
munity’s intuitions of justice. This assumption, however, is wrong. As
Study 1 (reported in Part II) shows, current crime control doctrines
seriously conflict with individuals’ intuitions of justice by exaggerating
the punishment deserved. Thus, a distribution of liability and punish-
ment that tracks lay intuitions of justice would significantly reduce the
injustice now present. As Part III explains, the modern crime control
13 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 1009 (2000) (arguing that assessment of law enforcement policies should depend
exclusively on their effects on individuals’ welfare and accord no independent weight to
conceptions of fairness in order to maximize crime control); Erik Luna, Punishment
Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
205, 225–27 (describing argument that using empirical desert as distributive principle may
result in increase of crime that might not be measurable ex ante).
14 For a discussion of these issues, see Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral
Philosophers in the Competition Between Philosophical and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1831, 1838–43 (2007).
15 See id. at 1839–40 (describing and criticizing philosophical attempts to harmonize
popular intuitions into “reflective equilibrium”).
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doctrines are not a product of the community’s sense of justice but
rather a product of the distortions inherent in American crime
politics.
There also is a persuasive response to the concern of the second
group that a desert distributive principle will increase avoidable crime.
The common wisdom of the past half-century has been that the system
is free to ignore doing justice in pursuit of crime control through
deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, and other such coercive
crime control programs—that there is no crime control cost incurred
in deviating from desert. This common wisdom is dangerously wrong.
There is disutility in injustice, and the crime control costs of deviating
from desert must be taken into account when designing an effective
crime-control program. Indeed, in the long run, doing justice may be
the most effective means of fighting crime.16
To telegraph our findings, Studies 2 and 3 (reported in Parts IV
and V, respectively) support the arguments we have made elsewhere
that doing justice, at least as the community perceives it, increases the
law’s moral credibility and thereby harnesses the crime-control
powers of social and normative influence. Deviating from desert
undermines the criminal justice system’s moral credibility and thereby
undermines its crime-control effectiveness. Specifically, it undermines
its power of stigmatization, increases the chances of vigilantism, pro-
motes resistance and subversion rather than the cooperation and
acquiescence required by the criminal justice system, undermines
compliance in borderline cases where the condemnatory nature of the
offense may be ambiguous, and reduces the criminal justice system’s
influence in the public conversation by which societal norms are
shaped. Studies 2a and 2b suggest that changes in the system’s moral
credibility can have these kinds of effects. Study 3 suggests that the
dynamics shown in these laboratory experiments also can be seen in
the datasets of existing national surveys.
We believe the studies reported here will assure both groups con-
cerned about a change to desert as the distributive principle for crim-
inal liability and punishment. The shift to a desert distribution—
specifically, empirical desert—will not seriously undermine the crim-
inal justice system’s crime-control effectiveness, and indeed may
enhance it, and is not likely to increase the system’s punitiveness, and
16 See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 210–12 (“[A] charge to R
prevent crime is, as a practical matter, a charge primarily to do justice—to consider just
desert—for that will reduce crime more than distributive criteria that ignore desert.”);
Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 1, at 29–31 (arguing that use of empirical desert as R
distributive principle strengthens law’s moral credibility); Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of
Justice, supra note 1, at 18–31 (same). R
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indeed is more likely to reduce it. This shift better tracks the commu-
nity’s shared intuitions of justice.
I
THE MOST POPULAR MODERN CRIME-CONTROL RULES
Do the community’s shared intuitions of justice lead to draconian
punishments? Described below are seven of the most common and
politically popular criminal justice doctrines expressly based upon
instrumentalist coercive crime-control strategies—usually those of
deterrence and incapacitation. These are not necessarily the statisti-
cally most common applications of these doctrines, but neither are
they aberrant applications by a rogue judge. Each instance is an
expected and intended application by the terms of the doctrine, and
many, if not most, have been reviewed and approved on appeal—
some by the United States Supreme Court. These are the legal doc-
trines against which individuals’ intuitions of justice are tested in
Study 1, as reported in Part II.
A. Three Strikes and Other Habitual Offender Statutes
The case of William James Rummel is not unusual.17 In 1964, the
twenty-one-year-old Texan uses his employer’s credit card to pay $80
for four new tires without permission. He later pleads guilty to felony
fraud. In 1969, Rummel forges a check for $28.36 to pay rent at a
hotel, another felony. Over a course of years, Rummel is convicted of
similar frauds four more times. On a hot August day in 1972, Rummel
enters a bar in San Antonio and notices that the air conditioner is
broken. He tells the bar’s owner that the unit needs a new com-
pressor, and offers to fix it for free if the owner will pay for the neces-
sary part. The owner gives him $120.75 for the compressor, but
Rummel never returns to the bar. After the owner decides to press
charges, Rummel is arrested.18 Rummel is found guilty of felony
theft,19 which typically would receive a sentence of two to ten years.20
However, because this is Rummel’s third felony conviction, he is
charged under a Texas recidivism statute and receives a sentence of
17 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980). For more details on the Rummel
case, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT
CHALLENGED THE LAW 28–32 (1999) [hereinafter ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT].
18 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 28 (4th ed. 2010).
19 ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT, supra note 17, at 32. R
20 Id. at 29.
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life imprisonment.21 His sentence is affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court.22
In another case, fifty-nine year old Charles Almond becomes
frustrated by the constant arguing of his two adult sons (who still live
at home) over which television program to watch. He picks up a .22
caliber revolver that his oldest son had left on the table, and shoots
out the television’s screen. Thirty years earlier, Almond had been con-
victed of burglarizing an unoccupied building, and twenty-five years
earlier, he was convicted both of throwing “a missile” (a rock) at an
automobile driven by his father-in-law and of breaking and entering
an office. Because of Almond’s decades-old felony convictions, a sen-
tence of fifteen years is imposed in the television-shooting case for
“possession of a firearm as a felon” combined with a “career
offender” statute.23
Such “three strikes” and other habitual-offender legislation com-
monly impose long prison terms on offenders who have committed
previous crimes. The underlying rationale for these statutes is typically
incapacitative.24 Advocates of such statutes reason that the offender’s
past recidivism shows that he cannot be deterred from future crime
and that incapacitation may be the most effective means of preventing
future offenses.25
Similar habitual-offender statutes, which became common in the
1990s,26 typically set high mandatory sentences for felonies committed
after the offender has been convicted of two prior felonies.27 The most
common form of such statutes requires the two previous felonies to be
21 Id. at 32. According to Texas penal law and practice at the time, Rummel may have
been eligible for parole after serving twelve years of his sentence with good behavior.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280; see also Brief for the Respondent, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980) (No. 78-6386), 1979 WL 199781, at *16–17 (explaining Texas’s parole system
and suggesting that Rummel would be eligible to serve twelve years with good conduct or
even ten if he earned “trusty status”).
22 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285; Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 654 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), vacating 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978).
23 Almond v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 439, 445 (W.D. Va. 1994); PAUL H. ROBINSON
& MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE
PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 132–33 (2005) [hereinafter ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW
WITHOUT JUSTICE].
24 See authorities and examples collected in Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness, supra
note 10, at 1429 n.2. R
25 See id. at 1429 n.7 (explaining incapacitation rationale for habitual offender statutes).
26 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1996 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF STATE SENTENCING STRUCTURES 16–17 & exhibit 1-9 (1998), available at http:/
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169270.pdf (noting in 1996 that twenty-four states had enacted two-
or three-strikes laws and that “overwhelming majority” of such laws had been passed
between 1993 and 1995).
27 Note that the number of “strikes” in recidivist statutes is not always three. It is some-
times two (North Dakota, South Carolina), and sometimes four (Georgia, Maryland). N.D.
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of a violent nature.28 Some jurisdictions allow the inclusion of other
felonies, such as drug-trafficking violations.29 Other jurisdictions have
habitual-offender statutes other than the famous “three strikes”
laws.30
B. Drug Offense Penalties
In another relatively typical case, Anthony Papa is asked by a
bowling partner to deliver an envelope containing cocaine to a town in
upstate New York in exchange for $500. The courier who gives him
the envelope is an undercover drug enforcement officer, and Papa is
arrested when he delivers the envelope, which contains 4.5 ounces of
cocaine. Under the controlling statute, the court imposes the required
sentence of fifteen years to life.31
Similarly, in the case of Harmelin v. Michigan,32 Harmelin is
driving through Detroit in the early morning when he makes an illegal
U-turn through a red light. After Harmelin is pulled over, he is
arrested for marijuana possession, and a police search uncovers 672
grams of cocaine in the car’s trunk—an amount approximately equal
in size to one-and-a-half soda cans. Harmelin, who has no prior police
record, is convicted under a Michigan drug statute and is sentenced to
a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole—a
sentence that the United States Supreme Court upholds as constitu-
tional and not in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.33
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-7 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (LexisNexis 2002).
28 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(C) (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (LexisNexis 2009); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2008).
29 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (2008) (requiring two strikes for violent felonies,
four strikes for others); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1997) (allowing for habitual
offender sentence when offender has two prior convictions for felonies of Class C or
above, which may include out-of-state felony convictions punishable by maximum prison
terms of five years or more); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (2003) (requiring life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole for offenders with two or more convictions for “most
serious offense[s],” including certain nonviolent crimes, or upon conviction of three or
more “serious offenses,” including drug trafficking felonies).
30 E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (2005) (imposing enhanced penalty for felonies where
defendant was previously convicted of felony); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2008) (speci-
fying sentence ranges for certain felonies by first-time, second-time, and third-time
offender status); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-7 (2006) (enhancing sentence for principal
felony if defendant was previously convicted of one or two felonies).
31 See Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, Talking with Anthony Papa, THE NATION, Dec. 27,
2004, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041227/tuhusdubrow. Papa serves twelve years of
his sentence before being granted clemency. Id.
32 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
33 Id. at 995–96.
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In United States v. Prince,34 Leroy Prince rents a room from
Sydney Griffith, the owner of a nearby furniture store. Prince fre-
quently helps move furniture from the house to Griffith’s business. In
exchange, Griffith agrees to provide furniture when Prince moves into
an apartment, as he is planning to do. On one occasion, at Griffith’s
request, Prince helps unload boxes at the house where Prince rents a
room. He smells marijuana during the unloading and confirms its
presence by partially opening a box. He continues to help with the
unloading but insists that the marijuana boxes be stored in a place
other than the house where he lives. He helps move the boxes to the
basement of a nearby grocery store. Customs inspectors later seize
forty-seven boxes, containing a total of 1169 kilograms of marijuana.
After being given downward adjustments under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines due to his minor role in the offense, his lack of knowledge
of the drug’s presence beforehand, and his guilty plea, Prince is sen-
tenced to five years’ imprisonment without the possibility of early
release.35
Though they are traditionally governed only by state law, drug-
related crimes have increasingly come under federal jurisdiction in
recent decades.36 In an attempt to increase deterrent effects, federal
sentencing for drug crimes has become quite harsh.37 The average fed-
eral sentence for drug-related crimes in 2005 was 85.7 months. If mari-
juana-related crimes are ignored, that average rises to 98.9 months. As
a point of comparison, the average federal sentence for all violent
crimes is 95.2 months. Homicide has an average sentence of 118.3
months—less than 20% higher than the average sentence for non-
marijuana drug offenses.38 Harsher federal penalties mean that an
ever-increasing number of cases that could be brought in state courts
are being prosecuted in federal court.39
34 110 F.3d 921 (2d Cir. 1997).
35 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range after those adjustments is fifty-one to sixty-
three months. Id. at 926.
36 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of
the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 259–60 (2000) (stating that
since 1970s, Congress has expanded federal jurisdiction over drug crimes, and noting that
“virtually any drug crime can now be prosecuted federally”).
37 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines suggest 0 to 6 months for possession, and 0 months
up to a maximum of 293 months for possession with intent to manufacture, import, export,
or traffic. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c), 2D2.1(a) (2006).
38 All sentencing statistics are taken from Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Defendants Sentenced in U.S. District Courts: By Offense, and Type and Length of
Sentence, Fiscal Year 2005, in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics tbl.5.25.2005, http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5252005.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
39 See Glaeser et al., supra note 36, at 260 (noting that expansion of federal jurisdiction R
and harsher federal penalties could implicate deterrence and equity considerations).
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C. Adult Prosecution of Juveniles
It is no longer unusual for prosecutors to try juveniles as adults,
even if this results in long prison terms.40 Nathaniel Brazill, thirteen
years old, is upset about being suspended from school for ten days just
before summer vacation for throwing water balloons. He returns to
the middle school to say good-bye to friends. When told by a seventh
grade teacher (with whom he has a good relationship) that he has to
leave, he pulls out a pistol and points it at the teacher. The gun dis-
charges, hitting the teacher in the head and killing him. After being
tried and convicted as an adult, he is sentenced to twenty-eight years
in prison without the possibility of parole.41
In another case, Zachary Eggers, a sixteen-year-old, is given two
natural-life terms for killing his parents.42 Witnesses testify that
Eggers was upset at his parents because he considered them to be too
strict.43 His attorney suggests that Eggers was intoxicated at the time
of the killings.44
As of the end of the 1990s, all jurisdictions in the United States
allow, in at least some cases, juveniles to be transferred to criminal
court and tried as adults.45 Transfers can be by discretionary, pre-
sumptive, or mandatory waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, as well
as by specific statutory criteria, and can be limited to specific offenses.
The lowest age for which transfer is allowed differs by jurisdiction.
Some jurisdictions do not list any minimum age for transfer.46 Others
allow transfer as early as age ten47 or age fourteen.48 Some jurisdic-
40 See infra notes 45–49; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (holding it R
unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes committed by defendant under
age eighteen).
41 See Kate Randall, Another Florida Teenager Receives Harsh Adult Prison Sentence,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Aug. 3, 2001), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/aug2001/
flor-a03.shtml.
42 Kim Smith, Teen Gets Life for Killings of His Parents, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 23,
2005, at B4.
43 Mitch Tobin, Teen Guilty in 2 Killings, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 25, 2005, at B1.
44 Id. When detectives searched his house, they found marijuana in Eggers’s room.
Appellee’s Answering Brief at 3, State v. Eggers, No. 2 CA-CR 05-0320 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005).
45 See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS
IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 1 (1998).
46 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101 (West Supp. 2009).
47 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-3-4 (LexisNexis 2007) (only for murder); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (2001).
48 E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34.1 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125 (West 2007);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26 (West Supp. 2010).
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tions retain a somewhat higher age for transfer, such as fifteen or six-
teen, and several retain this higher age with very limited exceptions.49
D. Abolition or Narrowing of the Insanity Defense
Eric Clark was a typical teenager until mental illness took over
his life. He is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a subtype of
schizophrenia characterized by delusions and hallucinations. He will
not drink tap water because he is fearful of lead poisoning. He
believes that alien life forms from another planet are after him. Clark
sets up a fishing line with beads and wind chimes throughout his home
as an alarm system for alien invasions. He also starts to keep a bird in
his car to warn him of any airborne poison. He sometimes circles the
neighborhood, blaring loud music in an attempt to keep the aliens
away. Clark thinks that the aliens are commonly disguised as govern-
ment agents.
After neighbors call the police to report the excessive noise he is
making, Clark is pulled over by a police officer. Believing the
policeman to be an alien, and not wanting to be abducted or killed,
Clark shoots and kills the officer. Clearly, Clark is dangerous in his
current state and needs to be civilly committed for as long as he
remains so. Yet it seems difficult to assess his blameworthiness
without taking account of his serious mental illness. The Arizona stat-
utes, however, have so narrowed the availability of defenses and miti-
gations related to mental illness that his disease is essentially legally
irrelevant to Clark’s criminal case.50 He is convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.51 The Supreme Court
upholds as constitutional the Arizona Supreme Court’s Mott rule,
which precludes the use of evidence of diminished capacity caused by
mental illness to negate the mens rea elements of a crime.52
Consider, similarly, the case of Andrea Yates.53 She, her husband,
and their four young boys live in a renovated bus. They are deeply
49 E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2307 (LexisNexis 2008) (at least fifteen, with one exception of
no minimum age for illegal possession of firearm within 1000 feet of school or day care
center); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 419C.349, .352 (2010) (fifteen, with no minimum-age excep-
tions for certain cases of murder, rape, sodomy and unlawful sexual penetration); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (2005) (sixteen, no exceptions); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.110 (West Supp. 2009) (sixteen, no exceptions).
50 Arizona law does not allow evidence of mental illness to be introduced to negate
specific intent elements for any crime. State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1997). The
State does allow a general insanity defense, but only one that is narrow in scope and that
puts the burden on the defendant to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that he was
insane. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-502(A)–(C) (LexisNexis 2008).
51 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 746 (2006).
52 Id. at 779.
53 Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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religious, often praying together, and want as large a family as pos-
sible. Unfortunately, Andrea increasingly manifests signs of mental ill-
ness. On one occasion, she attempts to commit suicide by swallowing
pills. Though given prescriptions for multiple medications, including
anti-psychotics, Andrea does not often take them. She often shakes,
fails to feed her children, mutilates herself, and claims that there are
cameras in the ceilings. Her husband Rusty stops a second, nearly suc-
cessful, suicide attempt, but does not report the incident to her physi-
cians. The Yates are warned against having more children because of
Andrea’s precarious mental state, but they soon have a fifth child, a
baby girl. The family moves from the bus into a house. Andrea’s con-
dition initially improves, but the improvement is short-lived. Andrea
is soon cutting herself again and refusing to feed her children. She
worries that her mental illness renders her a bad mother and that, as
their minister preaches, her children will then be doomed to eternal
torment in hell. One morning, after Rusty leaves for work, Andrea
fills the bathtub with water, then drowns each of her children. Her son
Noah tries to run, but Andrea grabs him and holds him under the
water as he struggles to escape. She believes that by killing her
children she is saving them from a horrifying existence of eternal
torment.
Again, one would think that her serious mental illness would sig-
nificantly reduce or eliminate her blameworthiness. Yet she is con-
victed of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment (though
the conviction is later overturned because of questionable testimony
by a state witness).54 Yates did not qualify for an insanity defense in
Texas because the state limits it to individuals who, owing to mental
illness, do not know that their conduct is criminal.55 Presumably,
Yates did know that her conduct was in violation of the state’s rules,
even though she thought she was doing the right thing in order to save
her children.
Today, two jurisdictions do not allow an insanity defense,
although they do allow evidence of mental illness to be used more
narrowly to negate the culpability requirements of an offense.56
Another thirty allow an insanity defense based only upon a cognitive
54 Id. at 216–22.
55 The Texas Penal Code provides: “It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at
the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect,
did not know that his conduct was wrong.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West 2003).
“Wrong” in this sense is interpreted under Texas law to mean “illegal.” Ruffin v. State, 270
S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
56 Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-214 (2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
305 (LexisNexis 2008).
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dysfunction; no defense is allowed for a control dysfunction no matter
how severe the impairment.57 The remaining nineteen allow an
insanity defense for either a cognitive or a control impairment.58
E. Strict Liability
It is now common for even serious offenses, like statutory rape, to
be treated as strict liability offenses. Under such a regime, a culpable
state of mind need not be proven with respect to a sexual partner’s
age. Consider the case of Raymond Garnett,59 a twenty-year-old men-
tally retarded man with an IQ of fifty-two. He is introduced to Erica,
who says that she is sixteen—a fact confirmed by her friends. Garnett
and Erica talk on the phone on and off—he enjoys talking to someone
who does not make fun of him. One night, at around 9:00 p.m., he is
stranded without a ride home, but notices Erica’s house nearby. As he
57 United States, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); Alabama, ALA. CODE § 15-16-2 (LexisNexis
2008); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
502(A)–(B) (2008); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (2008); California, People v.
Drew, 583 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1978); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-8-101(1), -104, -105(2)
(2007); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304a, 401 (2007); Florida, FLA. R. CRIM. P.
§ 3.217; Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2 (LexisNexis 2008); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-41-3-6, -4-1(b) (West 2004); Kansas, State v. Roadenbaugh, 673 P.2d 1166
(Kan. 1982) and State v. Grauerholz, 654 P.2d 395 (Kan. 1982); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:14 (2007); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (2006); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 2009); Mississippi, Herron v. State, 287 So. 2d 759 (Miss.
1974); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (West 2009); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2203 (2009); Nevada, Poole v. State, 625 P.2d 1163 (Nev. 1981); New Hampshire, State v.
Plummer, 374 A.2d 431 (N.H. 1977); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-2 (West 2005);
New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (Consol. 2008); North Carolina, State v. Vickers, 291
S.E.2d 599 (N.C. 1982); Oklahoma, Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1983);
Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 315 (West 1998); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-24-10 (2007); South Dakota, State v. Kost, 290 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1980);
Tennessee, State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. 1983); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 2.04, 8.01 (West 2003); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.030(2) (West
2002).
58 Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13(a) (2007); District of Columbia, Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2007); Hawaii,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400 (2009); Idaho, State v. White, 456 P.2d 797 (Idaho 1969); Iowa,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West 2003); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (West
2008); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109 (LexisNexis 2008); Massachusetts,
Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1967); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 768.21(a) (West 2008); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (LexisNexis 2009);
Ohio, State v. Anders, 277 N.E.2d 554 (Ohio 1972); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295
(2009); Rhode Island, State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 4801 (2009); Virginia, Godley v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 368 (Va. Ct. App.
1986); West Virginia, State v. Lockhart, 490 S.E.2d 298 (W. Va. 1997); Wisconsin, WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 2007); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304 (2009).
59 Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (Md. 1993). For further facts, see PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 114 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES] and ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT
JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 63–65. R
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approaches the house, Erica opens her upstairs bedroom window and
invites him in, directing him to use a nearby ladder. They talk for a
long time, have consensual intercourse, and Garnett leaves at about
4:30 a.m. When Erica gives birth eight-and-a-half months later, her
parents contact the police, who arrest Garnett for statutory rape.
Erica was thirteen years old at the time of their intercourse. Garnett is
charged with second-degree rape. Because the offense is one of strict
liability, he is not allowed to introduce evidence at trial showing that
his mistake as to her age was a reasonable one for him to make.60
In another case, nineteen-year-old Ras Haas lets two runaway
girls stay at his apartment. They tell him they are eighteen years old,
and at different times have consensual intercourse with him. He is
later arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child
because the girls, in fact, are fourteen and fifteen years old. At trial he
is not allowed to present evidence that he reasonably believed the
girls were over the age of sixteen, which is the age of consent required
by state law. Because the offense is one of strict liability, such reason-
ableness is irrelevant. He is sentenced to twenty to thirty years impris-
onment for each count, with the terms to be served consecutively.61
Roswold Adkins has consensual intercourse with a fourteen-year-
old girl who intentionally misrepresents her age. During deliberations,
the jury, apparently concerned about the issue, asks the judge about
taking the intentional misrepresentation into account in assessing lia-
bility and is told that it is irrelevant to liability because even a reason-
able mistake is no defense. Adkins is convicted of two counts of
criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to two concurrent terms of six-
and-a-half to twenty-two years.62
Most jurisdictions reject even a reasonable mistake as to age as a
defense to statutory rape.63 While other serious offenses, such as
60 Garnett’s prison sentence is suspended, and he is put on probation. Garnett, 632
A.2d 799, 803–04.
61 State v. Haas, No. A-05-804, 2006 WL 996535, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006).
62 People v. Adkins, No. 257845, 2006 WL 142120, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006).
63 See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 385–91 (2003) (categorizing each state’s
approach as among true crime, strict liability, and hybrid, with majority employing strict
liability). For states that employ a strict liability approach, see, for example, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.021 (West 2007), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(c) (West 2005), and WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 939.43(2) (West 2005). For states that allow for a mistake defense, see, for example,
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-3(c) (LexisNexis 2009), MO. REV. STAT. § 566.020 (2000), and
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-12 (LexisNexis 2005). The federal approach is a hybrid, with
strict liability only for sexual contact with children under the age of twelve. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441(d) (2006).
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driving under the influence, can be ones of strict liability,64 the bulk of
strict liability offenses are more minor, such as “public welfare
offenses,”65 speeding and other vehicular offenses, and liquor, nar-
cotics, and food regulation infractions.66 A few state courts have inval-
idated the use of strict liability for offenses that impose significant
prison sentences or create an unreasonable expectation of knowledge
in the offender.67 The Model Penal Code attempts to restrict the use
of strict liability to “violations” rather than crimes,68 although it too
imposes strict liability for the serious felony of aggravated statutory
rape.69
F. Felony Murder
The felony-murder doctrine punishes as murder all deaths caused
in the course of a felony, no matter how accidental the killing, and
applies such murder liability not just to the person causing the death
but to all accomplices in the underlying felony.70 The case of Jerry
Moore is not unusual. Moore agrees to help Montejo (an acquain-
tance) burglarize a house while the house’s owner is away. Neither
man is armed. When the resident returns unexpectedly, Moore is sur-
prised to see Montejo shoot and kill the owner with a gun he appar-
ently found in a nightstand. Moore is convicted of murder for
Montejo’s shooting of the homeowner and is sentenced to life impris-
onment at hard labor without the possibility of parole.71
In the case of Forrest Heacock, the defendant supplies cocaine to
people at a “drug party” that he attends. He and three other people
inject the cocaine; one of them overdoses and dies. Heacock is con-
victed of felony murder and is sentenced to forty years
imprisonment.72
64 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (2004) (listing states where driving under the
influence is treated as strict liability offense).
65 See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952) (comparing nature of
“public welfare offenses,” which involve neglect or inaction with regard to duty of care, to
accepted classifications of common law offenses, which involve “positive aggressions or
invasions”); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 84–88
(1933) (listing state cases involving public welfare offenses with no mens rea requirement).
66 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 272 n.1 (4th ed. 2003).
67 Id. at 279.
68 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
69 Id. § 213.6(1).
70 See LAFAVE, supra note 66, at 744–65 (providing general overview of felony murder R
rule).
71 State v. Moore, No. 2006-KA-1979, 2007 WL 914637, at *1 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 28,
2007).
72 Heacock v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Va. 1984). Heacock’s sentence is
actually eighty years imprisonment, but forty years of the sentence are suspended.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-DEC-10 12:04
December 2010] THE DISUTILITY OF INJUSTICE 1959
The most popular version of the rule, used by forty jurisdictions,
allows only inherently dangerous felonies (such as arson or drug traf-
ficking) to trigger the rule’s use.73 Ten jurisdictions allow the commis-
sion of any felony to be used.74 Two jurisdictions have abolished the
felony murder rule.75
G. Criminalization of Regulatory Violations
Robert Blandford and two other seafood importers are arrested,
tried, and convicted in federal court for violating the Lacey Act, which
criminalizes the importation of wildlife in violation of a U.S. or
foreign law.76 In this instance, the importation was in violation of a
Honduran law requiring the use of cardboard box–shaped containers
73 United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006); Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3)
(2009); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (2008); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1105(A)(2) (2010); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1-8-1-189 (West 2008); Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (West 2009); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53(a)-54(c) (West 2007); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (LexisNexis
2010); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 2007); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
4003(d) (2004); Illinois, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2002); Indiana, IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2, -3 (West 2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 707.2.2-.3 (2007); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401(b) (2007); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A)(1)
(2007); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 202(1) (2006); Maryland, MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2002); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
265, § 1 (LexisNexis 2008); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1)(b) (West
2004); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a)(2)-(3) (West 2009); Mississippi, MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(c) (2005); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1)(b) (2009);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303(2) (2009); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b)
(2009); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3.a(3) (West 2005); New York, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(3) (Consol. 1998); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West
2000); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1)(c) (1997); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2903.01(B) (West 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (2009); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2002); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(c)(a)(1) (2003); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4(1) (2006); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(2)–(3) (2006); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(d)
(LexisNexis 2008); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2009); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-32 (2009); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2005); Wisconsin, WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (West 2005); Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (2009).
74 Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (2006); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 636(a)(2) (2007); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2007); Missouri, MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.021.1(2) (1999); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b (2007); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1-A(2) (2004); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.7(B) (West 2002); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(b) (1998); Texas, TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West 2003); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.32.030(1)(c), -.050(1)(b) (2009).
75 Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 (1996); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507.020 (LexisNexis 2008).
76 16 U.S.C. § 1372 (2006).
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for seafood exports. The plastic bags used by Blandford did not vio-
late U.S. law. The men are sentenced to eight years in prison.77
In another case, Tom Lindsey, twenty-six, takes his brother and
six friends on a rafting and camping trip in the popular Hell’s Canyon
National Recreation Area, a park created and regulated by federal
law.78 Lindsey acquires the necessary permits to both raft and camp in
the area but does not strictly follow the relevant regulations. In order
to fish in the mornings, Lindsey and his friends launch their raft at
7:00 a.m., instead of waiting until 9:00 a.m., as the regulations require.
Additionally, they camp below the high-water mark of the river,
which is technically state and not federal land, in order to evade a
federal regulation forbidding campfires during the summer. Forest
Service agents arrest Lindsey and his brother. They later send Lindsey
a letter informing him that his permits have been revoked. Lindsey
and his brother are indicted on felony charges of camping without a
permit and building a campfire without a permit.79
The federal criminal code in particular has seen “unprecedented
expansion” in recent years.80 Between 1980 and 2004, there was a
thirty percent increase in federal offenses that are subject to criminal
penalties.81 Many of these new laws criminalize behavior typically
handled through civil regulatory actions, including the expansion of
77 United States v. McNab, 324 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2003); Tony Mauro, Lawyers See
Red Over Lobster Case, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1122023117263&hbx. The Honduran courts subsequently invalidated one of
the regulations serving as the basis for the violation of Honduran law—the requirement
that tails be no shorter than 5.5 inches. However, even though the laws were declared void
retroactively, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendants’ convictions,
stating that the District Court was able to determine on its own whether the law was valid
at the time the offense was committed. Thus, even though the defendants could not be
found liable for a violation under Honduran law, they were held liable for violation of the
Lacey Act. Id.
78 See ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 187 (discussing R
facts).
79 United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979); ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW
WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 187–89. Before being indicted, Lindsey shows the R
agents a stipulation in the legislation creating the Hells Canyon Recreation Area that
states that permits are not required to camp below the high-water mark. A district court
judge dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction. Lindsey, 595 F.2d at 6. However, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rules that the federal government has the power to regulate con-
duct on state land when necessary to protect adjacent federal land. Id. The case is
remanded to the District Court, but the prosecutor does not pursue it further. ROBINSON &
CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 192. R
80 Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 755 (2005).
81 Id. at 754.
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criminal liability for copyright infringement,82 environmental
offenses,83 and fiduciary irresponsibility.84
The phenomenon is not limited to federal law, although the
continuing expansion of state criminal codes has taken place in a
much longer time frame than has the federal code expansion. The
Illinois Criminal Code is a particularly striking example. In 1856, the
Code contained 131 crime definitions; by 1951 this number had bal-
looned to 460.85 Perhaps more telling is the expansion of Illinois’s
modern code: Though seventy-two pages long in 1961, the Code had
expanded to 1200 pages by the year 2000.86 Such rapid expansion is
not unique to Illinois, and in most cases it is the result of a number of
factors, including the continuous adoption of “designer offenses” cov-
ering actions already made illegal by more general statutes, the pas-
sage of laws covering “crimes du jour” that garner heavy news
coverage and public outrage, and other forms of ad hoc code amend-
ments tending to expand the range of criminal statutes.87
II
TESTING THE PERCEIVED JUSTICE OF MODERN CRIME-
CONTROL RULES: STUDY 1
The goal of this study is to compare subjects’ treatment of cases
involving the crime-control doctrines described in Part I to the law’s
treatment of those cases. Subjects were asked to rank and then assign
a specific punishment to the cases, and these rankings and assigned
punishments were then compared to the rankings and punishments
that the law gives the cases.
We also examined subjects’ treatment of a set of “milestone”
cases, which did not engage the various crime control doctrines of
interest, and we compared subjects’ responses to these cases with their
responses to the crime-control cases. We predicted that for the crime-
control cases, the subjects’ sentences would be much less punitive than
those of the law. In contrast, although we expected that there might
82 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); id. § 1204.
83 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006).
84 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2009 (2006); see also United States v. Ntshona, 156 F.3d 318 (2d Cir.
1998); United States v. Goldstein, 883 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1989).
85 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 513 (2001) (discussing rise in number of offenses).
86 In 2000, Governor George Ryan issued an Executive Order ordering the creation of
a Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission whose purpose was to study existing
criminal law and create clearer and more coherent standards. See 24 Ill. Reg. 7755 (May 4,
2000).
87 Michael T. Cahill & Paul H. Robinson, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the
States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170–73 (2003).
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be some discrepancies between subjects’ sentences and the law’s for
the milestone cases, we predicted that these would be much smaller
and less systematic than the discrepancies for the crime-control cases.
A. “Milestone” Scenarios
While people tend to agree on the proper rank order of cases on
the punishment continuum, at least for the kind of core harms at issue
here, some people tend to be harsh in their “sentencing,” while others
are lenient. To be able to account for these personal differences in
general sentencing severity, subjects were first asked to rank in order,
and then to assign specific punishments to a collection of twelve cases
that ranged along the punishment continuum. These twelve cases pro-
vided “milestones” for the subject’s punishment continuum, against
which the twelve “crime-control” cases embodying the crime-control
doctrines could be compared.
The “milestone” scenarios were taken from a 2007 study by Paul
H. Robinson and Robert Kurzban.88 In that study, subjects rank-
ordered twenty-four crime scenarios according to the amount of pun-
ishment deserved by the described offender. Most researchers would
consider this a quite demanding task, perhaps asking for more concen-
tration and effort than most subjects are willing or able to provide.
The task was also quite complex, requiring subjects to compare the
deserved punishment for each scenario to that for each of the other
twenty-three scenarios. Yet the researchers found that the subjects
had little difficulty performing the task and, indeed, displayed an
astounding level of agreement in the ordinal ranking of the scenarios
across demographics.89
A statistical measure of concordance, which measures the degree
of agreement between different subjects (in this instance, agreement
on rank ordering), is produced by Kendall’s W coefficient of concor-
dance; a Kendall’s W of 1.0 indicates perfect agreement, and 0.0 indi-
cates no agreement. In the study just described, the Kendall’s W was
.95 (with p < .001). This is a strikingly high level of agreement. One
might expect to get this high a Kendall’s W if subjects were asked to
judge the relative brightness of different groupings of spots, for
example.90 In the context of more subjective or complex comparisons,
88 Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1867 (2007).
89 Id.
90 See Charles M.M. de Weert & Noud A.W.H. van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central
and Peripheral Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1219–21 (1997) (describing experiment in
which subjects were asked to judge brightness of black and white patterns, yielding high
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 24  9-DEC-10 12:04
December 2010] THE DISUTILITY OF INJUSTICE 1963
such as asking travel magazine readers to rank the attractiveness of
eight different travel destinations, one gets a much lower Kendall’s W
of .52.91 When asking economists to rank the top twenty economics
journals according to quality, one study found a Kendall’s W of .095.92
In the present study, we used only twelve of the original twenty-
four scenarios. Table 1 shows the control cases that were used as
“milestone markers.” The text of each of these twelve “milestone”
scenarios is reproduced in Appendix A. As is apparent, this collection
of cases represents the full punishment continuum, from cases where
subjects impose no liability (scenarios 1 and 2), to cases of common
minor offenses, such as petty theft, to cases of common serious
offenses, such as first-degree murder. As it happens, each of the sce-
narios represents a different legal offense from the others, named in
the second column. The differences in seriousness perceived by the
subjects in Robinson and Kurzban’s earlier study generally match the
differences in offense grade assigned by typical American criminal
codes (based, as they often are, upon the Model Penal Code),93 as is
noted in the third column. The ranking of those subjects also corre-
sponds, in a general way, to the average sentences given to state
offenders, listed in the fourth column, and to the sentencing of federal
offenders provided by the federal sentencing guidelines, listed in the
last column.
91 See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices,
24 RISK ANALYSIS 1301, 1303 (2004) (illustrating results of study designed to elicit attitudes
regarding travel risks).
92 Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of
Journal Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1402, 1422 (2003) (examining percep-
tions of journal quality among American Economic Association (AEA) members, and
finding that these perceptions vary widely across AEA subgroups).
93 One might note that an exception here is the case of burglary, which is graded more
seriously by the criminal code than it is ranked by the subjects. This disparity is probably
due in large part to the problem of “combination offenses” (burglary is simply a combina-
tion of one offense, such as theft, and the offense of criminal trespass). For general discus-
sion of the problem of combination offenses, see ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 59, at 812–15, and Paul H. Robinson et al., Codifying Shari’a: R
International Norms, Legality, and the Freedom To Invent New Forms, 2 J. COMP. L. 1, 39
(2007).
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TABLE 1
CONTROL SCENARIOS—“MILESTONE MARKERS”
Model Penal Average State USSC Guideline
Scenario Offense Code Grade94 System Term95 Sentence96




11. Stabbing Second Degree Felony 1st 10.5 years* 19.5–24.5 years
Murder degree (§2 (§ 2A1.2)
10.2(1)(a))
10. Accidental Manslaughter Felony 2d 4.7–8.4 years 2.25–2.75 years
mauling by pit degree (§ 2A1.4(a)(2)(A))
bulls (§ 210.3(1)(a))
9. Clubbing Aggravated Felony 2d 4.3 years 6.5–8 years
during robbery Robbery degree (§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D),
(§ 222.1(1)(b)) (3)(B))
8. Attempted Attempted Felony 2d (<4.3 years*) 4.25–5.25 years
robbery at gas Robbery degree (§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(B))
station (§ 222.1(1)(b))
7. Stitches after Aggravated Felony 2d 2.6 years 3.75–4.75 years
soccer game Assault degree (§ 2A2.2(b)(2)(B),
(§ 211.1(2)) (3)(B))
6. Slap and Assault Misdemeanor (<2.6 years*) 4–10 months
bruising at (§ 211.1(1)(a)) (§ 2A2.3(b)(1)(A))
record store
5. Microwave Burglary Felony 3d 2.4 years 2–2.5 years
from house degree (§ 2B2.1(a)(1))
(§ 221.1(1))
4. Clock radio Theft Misdemeanor 1.5 years 0–6 months
from car (§ 223.1(2)(b)) (§ 2B1.1(a)(2))
3. Whole pies Petty Theft Petty offense – –
from buffet (§ 223.1(2)(b))
2. Wolf halluci- Assault— No liability – –
nation insanity (§ 4.01(1))
defense
1. Umbrella Theft—culpa- No liability – –
mistake bility defense (§2.02(1))
* National data are not available for this distinct category of offense.
Note that the data in each of the last three columns deviates
slightly from the order of scenarios as they appear in the table, which
is the order in which lay persons almost universally rank them.97 This
suggests that current state sentencing practice and the federal sen-
94 MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
95 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, First Releases from State Prison:
Sentence Length, Time Served, and Percent of Sentence Served, By Offense, in NATIONAL
CORRECTIONS REPORTING PROGRAM (2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2045.
96 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008).
97 Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 88, at 1868. R
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tencing guidelines are not based strictly upon the community’s shared
intuitions of justice.98 On the other hand, some of the inconsistency
between the community’s view and the rankings by average sentence
and guideline sentence no doubt arises from the fact that the state
sentencing average and the guideline sentence include a range of
cases—sentences for burglary, for instance, vary depending on
whether it was more or less aggravated. Thus, the last two columns
only give a general sense of the range in which such cases would nor-
mally fall.
B. “Crime-Control” Scenarios
In the present study, after considering the twelve “milestone”
scenarios, subjects were provided with twelve additional “crime-
control” scenarios and asked to include them in their ranking exercise.
Each of these “crime-control” scenarios summarizes the basic facts of
one of the specific real-world cases used to illustrate the operation of
the seven crime-control doctrines discussed in Part I. Table 2 shows
the real-world case upon which each scenario is based, the crime-
control doctrine that it illustrates, and the actual sentence imposed
under that doctrine, in order of subjects’ rankings.99 The text of each
of these “crime-control” scenarios is reproduced in Appendix B.
98 Federal and state sentences typically are a product of the exercise of judicial discre-
tion or crime-control policymaking. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Policies at
Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1377 n.24 (2009) (collecting studies of how judges’
different sentencing philosophies influence sentencing outcomes); Max M. Schanzenbach
& Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical
Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 720 n.30 (2008) (finding in empirical studies
that policy preferences of judges influence sentencing and that judges selectively use
adjustments and departures to enhance or reduce sentences); see also Dissenting View of
Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the
United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,915, 18,121–22 (May 1, 1987)
(arguing that federal sentencing guidelines as promulgated lacked coherent organizing
principle).
99 While offenders typically may be required to serve the entire sentence imposed, they
also may be released from prison to parole supervision, subject to reimprisonment for a
parole violation. These are the actual prison terms served by those offenders for whom
information is available: Yates, whose life sentence was overturned on appeal due to ques-
tions regarding the proof of the underlying facts, has been held in a state mental hospital
for three years with no release date currently set. Woman Not Guilty in Retrial in the
Deaths of Her 5 Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A20. Brazill has a scheduled release
date in 2028, which would mean a term served of almost twenty-seven years. FLA. DEP’T
OF CORR., INMATE POPULATION INFORMATION DETAIL, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/Active
Inmates/detail.asp?Bookmark=2&From=list&SessionID=486501272 (last visited Oct. 27,
2010). Clark, who has served six years as of this writing, has no release date set. ARIZ.
DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.azcorrections.gov/inmate_datasearch/results.aspx?Inmate
Number=180165&LastName=CLARK&FNMI=E&SearchType=SearchInet (last visited
Oct. 27, 2010). Rummel’s conviction was overturned after eight years in prison, on a claim
of incompetent representation, after which an agreement was struck for a sentence of time
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Scenario Case Name Offense Doctrine Sentence
L. Accidental Brazill Murder Adult Prosecu- 28 years without
teacher shooting tion of Juveniles parole
K. Drowning Yates Murder Narrowing Life
children to save Insanity Defense
them from hell
J. Accomplice Moore Felony murder, Felony Murder Life at hard
killing during burglary labor without
burglary parole
I. Killing officer Clark Murder Narrowing Life
believed to be Insanity Defense
alien




G. Cocaine in Harmelin Complicity in Drug Offense Life without
trunk unlawful distribu- Penalties parole
tion of controlled
substance
F. Air condi- Rummel Petty fraud Three Strikes Life
tioner fraud




D. Underage sex Garnett Statutory rape Strict Liability 5 years
by mentally
retarded man
C. Marijuana Papa Unlawful posses- Drug Offense 8 years
unloading sion of controlled Penalties
substance
B. Shooting of Almond Unlawfully dis- Three Strikes 15 years without
TV charging firearm parole
A. Incorrect lob- Blandford Violation of Criminalizing 15 years to life
ster container importation regu- Regulatory Vio-
lations lations
served. S.A. Man Finally Free After 8-Year Ordeal, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 15,
1980, at 2-A C. Haas has a projected release date in 2035, which would mean a term served
of just under thirty years. NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., NEBRASKA INMATE DETAILS,
http://dcs-inmatesearch.ne.gov/Corrections/InmateDisplayServlet?DcsId=62184 (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2010). Blandford has a release date in 2011, which would mean a term served
of eight years. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE LOCATOR, http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/
InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). Almond was
released from prison in 2006, after having served thirteen years. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
INMATE LOCATOR, http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=Name
Search (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). Papa served twelve years. Tuhus-Dubrow, supra note 31. R
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We do not suggest that these cases are the statistically most
common application of these crime-control doctrines. However,
neither are they aberrant applications by a rogue judge. Each is an
application of the doctrine as intended by its drafters and, in most
cases, as specifically approved on appeal as a proper application in
several instances by the United States Supreme Court. It only takes a
few objectionable cases to undermine the system’s moral credibility in
peoples’ minds. What we know about making and keeping reputations
tells us that intention counts enormously: Accidental or unavoidable
injustices or failures of justice may be forgiven if the system appears
to be committed to trying to do justice.100 When revealed, deviations
from desert are intended by the system. When they are planned and
predictable applications of the criminal law’s rules, as with the modern
crime-control doctrines examined here, then even a single telling case
can have detrimental consequences.
C. Study 1 Design and Methodology
1. Study Design
The study was administered and funded by the National Science
Foundation’s Time Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences
(TESS). The 317 subjects were recruited broadly from across the
United States and were demographically heterogeneous, representing
a wide range of socioeconomic, racial, and religious backgrounds.101
100 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 496 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert] (“An error can be for-
given if it is seen as ‘out of character.’ [People’s] view of the system is likely to be governed
by what they think the system is trying to do, by what they see as its motivation to do
justice.”).
101 TESS relies on a company called Knowledge Networks, which recruits samples from
a panel that is representative of the entire U.S. population. To create this panel,
Knowledge Networks utilizes probability-based sampling methods, using both random-
digit dialing and address-based sampling. Panel members do not need to be current web
users, as Internet access and hardware are provided as needed. The random-digit dialing
method incorporates both listed and unlisted telephone numbers as well as cell phone
numbers. Panel members are all randomly selected, and unselected volunteers are not able
to join. For a more complete description of this method, see KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS,
KNOWLEDGEPANEL DESIGN SUMMARY (2010), available at http://www.knowledgenetworks
.com/knpanel/docs/KnowledgePanel(R)-Design-Summary-Description.pdf.
Forty-three subjects were excluded from our data analysis for not completing the ini-
tial ranking task. The remaining 317 subjects had the following demographic characteris-
tics: Age: 18-29, 24%; 30-44, 27%; 45-59, 28%; 60+, 20%. Gender: male, 51%; female, 49%.
Marital status: married, 60%; divorced or separated, 12%; widowed, 2%; living with
partner, 5%; never married, 21%. Race: white, 80%; black, non-Hispanic, 7%; Hispanic,
9%; other, 4%. Education: some college, 24%; two-year college degree, 10%; four-year
college degree, 25%; Master’s degree, 9%; professional or doctorate degree, 3%. Median
household income: $60,000-$74,999. Employment status: currently employed, 61%; retired,
14%; not working (laid off, looking for work, disabled, other), 25%. Political views:
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In the first part of the task, subjects were given the twelve “mile-
stone” scenarios and were asked to rank order them in terms of their
relative degree of seriousness—that is, in terms of the relative blame-
worthiness of the main character in each case. The cases were
presented in a new random order for each subject. Following this, sub-
jects were then given the twelve “crime-control” cases and were asked
to perform the same task. However, the transition between the two
blocks of cases was seamless for the subjects. They were not aware of
any difference between the two sorts of cases, and instead had the
experience of ranking twenty-four cases in turn. The twenty-four cases
are reproduced in Appendices A and B.
In the second part of the task, subjects indicated what they
thought was an appropriate level of punishment for each case. The
instructions asked subjects to report their own judgments about the
amount of punishment deserved in each case (if any), not what they
thought the law or other persons would assign. They indicated the spe-
cific amount of punishment they would give to the offender in each of
the twenty-four cases by using the punishment continuum response
scale reproduced in Appendix B. In the third part of the task, subjects
were asked to respond to ten questions which asked for their general
impressions about the American criminal justice system.
2. Procedure
The task was computerized and run over the Internet using a
sample of subjects that were recruited by TESS. In the first part of the
task, subjects were presented with a vertical array on the left side of
the screen, which was labeled “Most serious case (person most blame-
worthy)” at the top, and “Least serious case (person least blame-
worthy)” at the bottom. A description of each new case was presented
on the right side of the screen. Each case had a brief title, followed by
a short paragraph describing the circumstances of the case. Subjects
read the description of each case and then dragged the case with a
mouse cursor to a point on the vertical array corresponding to its rela-
tive rank order of blameworthiness. They were then presented with
the next case. Once a case had been dragged over to the vertical array,
only its title was visible. However, by dragging the mouse over the
title, the full description of the case would be visible in a pop-up
window. If they wanted to make adjustments to their ordering, sub-
jects were able to subsequently move each case by dragging it to a new
position with the mouse cursor. Once subjects had ranked all twenty-
extremely liberal, 2%; liberal, 16%; slightly liberal, 14%; moderate, 30%; slightly conserva-
tive, 15%; conservative, 20%; extremely conservative, 4%.
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four cases, they were prompted to review and finalize the order they
had constructed.
Subjects then assigned exact punishment amounts to the twenty-
four cases they had previously rank ordered. Each case was displayed
on the right side of the screen in the rank order that the subject had
previously decided upon. Only the title of each case was visible to
subjects without further action, but as in the first part of the proce-
dure, subjects could reveal the full description of a case by dragging
the mouse cursor over its title. On the left side of the screen was a
sentence table which contained slots corresponding to different pun-
ishment amounts. The subjects’ task was to drag each case to a punish-
ment amount that they felt was appropriate given the
blameworthiness of the offender. As shown in the Appendix, the sen-
tence table contained slots corresponding to no punishment, including
a “liability but no punishment” option, as well as a “no liability”
option. Each punishment amount was capable of taking up to seven
cases, so that several cases could be assigned the same sentence if the
subjects so chose.
Subjects could assign punishments in any order they chose. How-
ever, the program was structured such that they were not able to vio-
late their initial rank ordering in assigning punishment amounts. That
is, punishment amounts had to follow a descending order from the
case judged most blameworthy to the case judged least blameworthy,
allowing ties for cases that were rated adjacent to one another in
blameworthiness. This was done to ensure intra-subject consistency
between the rankings of blameworthiness and the punishment
amounts, as demanded by the deserved punishment assessment that
subjects were instructed to impose.
Finally, in the third part of the study, subjects responded to ten
questions on nine- and seven-point scales which assessed their general
attitudes toward the American criminal justice system. These ques-
tions are not of primary relevance in interpreting the present results,
so we do not discuss them further.
D. Study 1 Results and Discussion
Table 3 below sets out the subjects’ mean ranking for each sce-
nario. The “milestone” scenarios are in bold, and the crime-control
cases are in italics. The rank order among the “milestone” scenarios
matches that of the previous study from which they were taken.102
Together they present a continuum of blameworthiness along which
the modern “crime-control” scenarios, in italics, can be placed.  Con-
102 See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 88. R
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sistent with previous research, subjects tended to agree very strongly
on the rank ordering of the “milestone” cases (Kendall’s W  = .86, p <
.001). There was also moderate agreement on the rank ordering of the
“crime-control” cases (Kendall’s W  = .52, p < .001). Table 3 lists the
scenarios in the order in which they were ranked by the subjects on
average.
TABLE 3
SUBJECTS’ MEAN RANKINGS OF SCENARIOS
Scenario Legal Analysis Mean Rank
12. Ambush shooting First Degree Murder 23.3
11. Stabbing Second Degree Murder 22.0
10. Accidental mauling by pit bulls Manslaughter 19.0
L. Accidental teacher shooting Murder - by juvenile 18.8
K. Drowning children to save them Murder - mental illness 18.4
from hell
J. Accomplice killing during burglary Felony murder, burglary 17.9
9. Clubbing during robbery Aggravated Robbery 17.3
8. Attempted robbery at gas station Attempted Robbery 16.0
I. Killing officer believed to be alien Murder - mental illness 15.6
H. Cocaine overdose Felony murder, unlawful distribution 14.7
of controlled substance
7. Stitches after soccer game Aggravated Assault 13.9
6. Slap and bruising at record store Assault 11.8
G. Cocaine in trunk Complicity in unlawful distribution of 11.5
controlled substance
F. Air conditioner fraud Petty fraud - prior record 10.6
5. Microwave from house Burglary 10.1
E. Sex with female reasonably Statutory rape - lack of culpability 9.0
believed overage
4. Clock radio from car Theft 8.7
D. Underage sex by mentally retarded Statutory rape - lack of culpability 7.8
man
C. Marijuana unloading Unlawful possession of controlled 7.2
substance
B. Shooting of TV Unlawfully discharging firearm - 6.4
prior record
3. Whole pies from buffet Petty Theft 6.2
A. Incorrect lobster container Violation of importation regulations 5.8
2. Wolf hallucination Insanity Defense 5.6
1. Umbrella mistake Culpability Defense 2.2
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 3 is the locations of the
modern “crime-control” scenarios. Recall from Table 2’s last column
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that most of the cases were given very high sentences: The top eight
(E–L) were given sentences comparable to that of murder—life
imprisonment or its equivalent. If the subjects’ rankings had followed
the law’s treatment of these cases, they would have been ranked at the
top of the list, above or between the “milestone” murder scenarios of
twelve and eleven. Instead, the top three “crime-control” cases were
ranked as being less serious than the “milestone” manslaughter case
involving an accidental killing by dogs. The next two “crime-control”
cases are ranked as being even less serious—between the “stitches
after soccer game” and “attempted robbery at a gas station” scenarios.
The next two “crime-control” cases (both of which the law treats as
comparable to murder), are ranked by subjects between the “stealing
a microwave from a house” and the “slap and bruising at the record
store” scenarios. The last case treated by the law as similar to murder
is ranked somewhere between “stealing a radio from a car” and
“stealing a microwave from a house.” The same dramatic disparity is
also seen in the remaining four “crime-control” cases, for which the
modern crime-control doctrines give sentences of five to fifteen years
or more. The subjects, in contrast, treated the cases as almost trivial
violations—more like “taking pies from an all-you-can-eat buffet,”
but less serious than “taking a radio from a car.” It seems indisputable
that the modern crime-control doctrines are treating cases in ways
that dramatically conflict with laypersons’ intuitions of justice.
The same serious disparity is evident when comparing the
sentences that the subjects gave the scenarios to the actual sentences
that courts gave the “crime-control” cases, as set out in Table 4
below.103 As before, the scenarios are listed in the order in which they
were ranked by the subjects.
103 Subject responses of “death” were coded as fifty years, and subject responses of
“life” were coded as forty years. Using these values, the mean sentences for Scenarios 12
and 11 were 44.5 and 38.9 years, respectively.
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TABLE 4
SUBJECTS’ MEAN SENTENCES FOR SCENARIOS COMPARED
TO ACTUAL SENTENCES
Scenario Subjects’ Mean Sentence Actual Court Sentence
12. Ambush shooting Between life and death
11. Stabbing Essentially life
10. Accidental mauling by pit 20.6 years
bulls
L. Accidental teacher shooting 19.2 years 28 years without
(juvenile) parole
K. Drowning children to save 26.3 years life
them from hell (insanity)
J. Accomplice killing during 17.7 years life at hard labor
burglary (felony murder) without parole
9. Clubbing during robbery 12.0 years
8. Attempted robbery at gas 9.1 years
station
I. Killing officer believed to be 16.5 years life
alien (insanity)
H. Cocaine overdose (felony 10.7 years 40 years
murder)
7. Stitches after soccer game 5.0 years
6. Slap and bruising at record 3.9 years
store
G. Cocaine in trunk (drugs) 4.2 years life without parole
F. Air conditioner fraud (3 3.1 years life without parole
strikes)
5. Microwave from house 2.3 years
E. Sex with female reasonably 2.9 years 40 to 60 years
believed overage (strict liability)
4. Clock radio from car 1.9 years
D. Underage sex by mentally 2.3 years 5 years
retarded man (strict liability)
C. Marijuana unloading (drugs) 1.9 years 8 years
B. Shooting of TV (3 strikes) 1.1 years 15 years without
parole
3. Whole pies from buffet 8.3 months
A. Incorrect lobster container 9.7 months 15 years to life
(regulatory)
2. Wolf hallucination 1.1 years
1. Umbrella mistake 1.8 months
The data is graphically presented in Figure 1 below. The solid
lines show the subjects’ punishment decisions—dark for the “mile-
stone” cases and lighter for the “crime-control” cases. The dotted
lines show the law’s actual sentences.
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FIGURE 1
COMPARISON OF SUBJECTS’ AND LAW’S “CRIME-CONTROL”
CASE SENTENCES
The difference in the slope of the solid versus dotted lines for the
same case shows the extent of the disparity between the subjects and
the law for the crime-control cases. Note that the punishment scale is
exponential rather than linear (to reflect the way American criminal
codes define offense grades and the way lay people think about pun-
ishment differences104); moving up the scale from one large dot to the
next may in fact reflect a doubling or tripling of the punishment. Thus,
104 For a more detailed explanation of the scale, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN
DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 8
(1995).
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the differences in slope that the graphic shows actually represent
enormous disparities.105
Within this sampling, the crime-control doctrines most divergent
from community views include drug offense penalties, three-strikes
(habitual offender) doctrines, strict liability offenses, and felony
murder. The differences between community intuitions and legal
treatment are sometimes astonishing: 40–60 years instead of 2.9 years
(E, strict liability), life without parole instead of 3.1 years (F, three
strikes), 40 years instead of 10.7 years (H, felony murder), and life
without parole instead of 4.2 years (G, drug offense).106
These differences appear even though our TESS Internet sample
of subjects seems quite punitive. Indeed, they are considerably more
punitive than the criminal courts typically are when dealing with cases
such as those represented by the “milestone” scenarios. The sentences
that the subjects imposed in these cases (see Table 4, column 2, bold
entries) are often double or triple the punishment imposed in real-
world practice (compare Table 1, columns 4 and 5).107 (The TESS
results are also quite a bit more punitive than any of our pilot test’s
samples, which were drawn from University of Pennsylvania under-
105 Subjects’ sentences were less severe than the law’s for each test case considered on
its own, all ps < .001. And the subjects’ sentences for the crime-control cases were, on
average, twenty years less severe than the sentence actually handed down in the case, a
difference that is highly significant (t (307) = 78.81, p < .001). P-values represent the
probability of obtaining the data given that the null hypothesis of no difference between
the means is true. The p-values yielded by this t-test represent the probability of obtaining
the observed data given that the null hypothesis of no difference between subjects’
sentences and those of the law’s is true.
106 The two insanity cases, I and K, were given two of the highest rankings and
sentences among the “crime-control” cases (although not nearly as high as the courts
gave). Those mean rankings and sentences are the result of a bimodal distribution (the
only two cases of the twenty-four to have such), and both stood out as having the highest
standard deviations (6.1 and 6.3, respectively, for rankings, and 16.7 and 19.0, respectively,
for sentences) of the twenty-four cases. As earlier studies have suggested, lay intuitions are
quite sympathetic to mitigations and excuses for seriously mentally ill offenders. See infra
text accompanying note 128. R
107 This comparison between subjects’ sentences and time served in state systems is
appropriate because our subjects imposed the terms of imprisonment that they wanted to
be served, without procedures for early release that some state systems permit. The federal
system requires offenders to serve eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed. See
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2006)) (stating that prisoner may receive credit toward sentence of up to
fifty-four days at end of each year of prisoner’s sentence for satisfactory behavior, resulting
in fifteen percent reduction of sentence, or eighty-five percent of sentence imposed).
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graduates.108) Despite this punitiveness of the TESS sample, the
modern crime-control doctrines still produced sentences that dramati-
cally exceeded those of the subjects.
While the sentences generated by the crime-control cases far
exceed the subjects’ sentences, for the milestone cases, in contrast, the
law’s sentences are generally less than the subjects’ sentences.109 Thus,
in the subjects’ view, the law in the milestone cases is doing no injus-
tice to offenders whatsoever (indeed, if the subjects have a complaint,
it is that the law is not punishing the offenders enough).
E. Previous Studies
The previous studies that touch on these matters are consistent
with the results reported here.
Three Strikes and Habitual Offender Statutes. The available
studies suggest that people do see subsequent offenses as being
slightly more blameworthy than equivalent first-time offenses but that
they do not support the dramatic increases common in American
habitual offender statutes.110 That the political position differs so
108 Comparison of Punishment Assessments: TESS Sample Versus Pilot Sample
(University of Pennsylvania undergraduates, N = 46):
Pilot
Scenario Offense TESS Sample Sample
12. Ambush shooting First Degree Murder 44.5 years 39.4 years
11. Stabbing Second Degree Murder 38.9 years 34 years
10. Accidental mauling by pit bulls Manslaughter 20.6 years 15.1 years
9. Clubbing during robbery Aggravated Robbery 12.0 years 7.8 years
8. Attempted robbery at gas station Attempted Robbery 9.1 years 4.8 years
7. Stitches after soccer game Aggravated Assault 5.0 years 1.7 years
6. Slap and bruising at record store Assault 3.9 years 11.5 months
5. Microwave from house Burglary 2.3 years 8.4 months
4. Clock radio from car Theft 1.9 years 5.5 months
3. Whole pies from buffet Petty Theft 8.3 months 6 days
2. Wolf hallucination Assault - insanity defense 1.1 years 2.8 months
1. Umbrella mistake Theft - culpability defense 1.8 months No
punishment
109 Compare the law’s sentences for the milestone cases as shown by the average state
sentences on Table 1, column 4, to the subjects’ sentences shown on Table 4, column 2, in
bold. Only in milestone case 5 (microwave from house) does the law’s average sentence
exceed the subjects’ average sentence (2.4 years versus 2.3 years, respectively). On average,
the milestone cases did not produce nearly as much deviation from the law as did the
crime-control cases (t (307) = 87.08, p < .001).
110 See, e.g., Brandon K. Applegate et al., Assessing Public Support for Three-Strikes-
and-You’re-Out Laws: Global Versus Specific Attitudes, 42 CRIM. DELINQ. 517, 526 tbl.3
(1996) (illustrating disparity between respondents’ disfavor of leniency and support for life
sentences for three-time offenders). Other studies in the area have examined the effect of
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markedly from the lay intuitive view of justice is shown in a study
comparing the two. Subjects given a survey in Ohio were asked
whether they supported or opposed passing a “three strikes and
you’re out” law in their jurisdiction.111 Of all respondents, 88.4%
answered that they would support such a measure.112 The same set of
subjects was then presented with a vignette, identified as a passage
from a newspaper story, in which the story’s imaginary subject com-
mitted a serious felony after having committed two previous crimes in
the state (the point being that under a three-strikes regime, the pun-
ishment would be life imprisonment). Respondents were asked to
assign an appropriate punishment on a scale ranging from “no punish-
ment at all” to “life in prison, with no possibility of being released.”113
Whereas true support for habitual-offender statutes would seem to
predict a majority of answers in the “life in prison” range, only 16.9%
of respondents gave this answer.114 More tellingly, only 11.1% of
those who chose a sentence of less than thirty years in prison (a group
that includes 86.4% of all subjects) had answered that they opposed
three-strikes legislation.115 Respondents simply did not sentence
according to their reported beliefs. Though there is widespread polit-
ical support for habitual-offender statutes, lay intuitions of justice sig-
nificantly contravene the reported public sentiment.
Drug Offenses. The available empirical evidence suggests that,
while many people see drug offenses as serious, they typically are not
viewed as being nearly as blameworthy as current sentences would
suggest. In one study, subjects ranked the offense of marijuana posses-
sion as a rather minor offense, comparable to, at most, a minor
theft.116 Possession of cocaine was deemed a bit more serious but still
only about as blameworthy as a slightly more serious theft.117 A con-
viction for dealing cocaine was seen as being considerably more
multiple offenses all committed before the offender is caught and punished for any of the
offenses. Generally, sentencing for multiple past offenses shows a decrease in added pun-
ishment amount for each additional offense, rather than an increase. See PAUL H.
ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 189–97 (1995) [hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY, AND BLAME] (discussing theories and patterns of multiple-offense sentencing).
111 Id. at 522 tbl.2.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 523–24.
114 Id. at 525.
115 Id.
116 Compare Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 88, at 1885 tbl.6 (illustrating mean rank R
of 7.4 assigned to marijuana possession in Study 3), and id. at 1888 tbl.8 (illustrating mean
rank of 2.2 assigned to marijuana possession in Study 4), with id. at 1869 tbl.1 (showing
mean rank of 6.8 assigned to short-changing in Study 1), and id. at 1876 tbl.3 (showing no
offense with mean rank comparable to 2.2 in Study 2).
117 Id. at 1885.
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blameworthy—more akin to breaking into a car or robbery.118
Importing cocaine was seen as more serious still, similar in seriousness
to burglary or assault.119
Other studies come to similar conclusions. The National Sample
Survey of Public Opinion on Sentencing Federal Crimes asked nation-
wide respondents to assign a sentence to crimes, presented as
vignettes.120 Marijuana possession was assigned a mean sentence of
0.98 years; heroin possession received a mean of 2.7 years; cocaine
possession received a median of 3 years, and possession of crack was
assigned a median sentence of 3 years.121 Trafficking in drugs was pun-
ished significantly more severely; trafficking marijuana, for example,
garnered a mean sentence of 15.3 years.122
Adult Prosecution of Juveniles. The available studies suggest that
people dramatically mitigate punishments for children, even for the
most serious offenses. In one study, a youth was described as commit-
ting the horrific offense of pouring gasoline on a sleeping companion
and setting him on fire. Although the offense generates high liability
and punishment judgments when committed by an adult, it generated
quite limited punishment when the offender was described as young:
When the offender was described as fourteen years old, 23% of the
subjects would impose no liability, and the average sentence was 5.4
years. When the offender was described as ten years old, 47% of the
subjects would impose no liability, and the average liability was 11
months.123
Another recent study attempted to measure public sentiment
regarding prosecution of juveniles by describing an offender and
showing a videotape of that offender committing a robbery.124 Sub-
jects were then asked to rate various aspects of the subject’s culpa-
bility—but different test subjects were told that the subject was a
118 Id.
119 Id. Note that the subjects in the study with the larger, more demographically diverse
subject pool (Study 2) treated these four drug offenses as significantly less serious than
those in the smaller, more narrow pool of Study 1. Compare the mean rankings found in
Table 6 (Study 3) to those of Table 8 (Study 4), which suggests that the text here may
overstate the seriousness with which the population generally sees drug offenses. Id. at
1885–88.
120 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY: PUBLIC OPINION ON
SENTENCING FEDERAL CRIMES 25 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/nss/jp_exsum.
htm.
121 Id. at 49.
122 Id. at 47.
123 ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, supra note 110, at 141 R
tbl.5.5.
124 Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Public Attitudes About the Culpability and Punishment of
Young Offenders 7 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 07-135, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959635.
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different age (twelve, fifteen, or twenty), and the voice in the video
and picture presented were altered to fit the test age.125 The study’s
preliminary results have found that though age is not a factor in sub-
jects’ beliefs about the offender’s potential for rehabilitation, it is a
significant predictor of perceptions of responsibility for the crime and
of whether the offender should be tried as an adult.126 Subjects indi-
cated that the twelve-year-old was significantly less responsible for the
crime than the other two ages and were less likely to answer that the
twelve-year-old offender should be tried in adult criminal court.127
Abolition of Insanity. The available evidence suggests that people
do indeed hold mentally ill offenders blameless when they either do
not understand the criminality of their conduct or, if they do under-
stand it, have a substantially impaired capacity to control their con-
duct. In one study, the vast majority of subjects (66% to 92%,
depending upon the facts of the case) imposed no liability in such
cases, and even those who did impose liability significantly mitigated
the punishment even for a serious offense.128
Strict Liability. Available research suggests that people generally
do not impose liability in the absence of some level of culpability for a
violation. For example, in one study, offenders who made reasonable
mistakes about whether a sexual partner was underage were given no
punishment by 88% of the subjects, with substantial mitigation of pun-
ishment by those few subjects who imposed any.129
Felony Murder. The available empirical evidence suggests that
peoples’ intuitions of justice do not support either the aggravation of
culpability or the complicity aspect of the felony murder rule. In one
study, for example, subjects aggravated culpability for an accidental
killing during a felony but only to the level of manslaughter, not
murder.130 The accomplice in the felony is punished at an even lower
level than manslaughter,131 reflecting a common tendency of people to
discount the liability of accomplices even though the legal doctrine
typically treats the two as having identical liability.132
125 Id. at 8–9.
126 Id. at 13–14.
127 Id.
128 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME, supra note 110, at 132 R
tbl.5.2 (illustrating respondents’ desires to impose civil commitment in cases involving
serious offenses).
129 See id. at 89 tbl.4.1 (showing respondents’ negligible imposition of punishment in
light of negligent mistake).
130 See id. at 172–73 tbl.6.3, 179–80.
131 Id. at 180 (“[W]hile the [felony murder] doctrine treats the accomplice exactly like a
murderer, the subjects impose liability somewhat less than they would for manslaughter.”).
132 Id. at 36 tbl.2.9, 208–10 (dichotomous-continuous discussion). Norman Finkel ana-
lyzed the responses of study subjects to felony-murder hypothetical cases, among others.
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III
HOW CAN A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS PRODUCE LIABILITY
RULES THAT THE COMMUNITY SEES AS UNJUST?
By this point, one central question must have struck the reader:
How can freely elected and presumably accountable legislators enact
criminal justice provisions that are responsive to public sentiment
regarding crime but are in conflict with the community’s shared intu-
itions of justice? The concept itself seems to be a contradiction in
terms. Indeed, politicians often cite public demand as the prime moti-
vation behind enactments of strict criminal law provisions, indicating
that they at least publicly believe themselves to be fulfilling their dem-
ocratic function.133
There is no short answer to be found, except that the seeming
conflict here is real and can be at least partially explained by a number
of factors that shape society, community perceptions, and the mecha-
nisms of local and national legislation. Though no one factor is
responsible on its own for the enactment of popularly supported poli-
cies that in fact conflict with empirical desert, a number of complex
processes play a role in leading legislatures to criminalize actions that
NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 164–71 (1995). His data are hard to interpret
because he placed his subjects in the roles of juror and appellate judge, so it is difficult to
tell whether their decisions enforcing felony-murder rules reflected their own intuitions of
justice or reflected their carrying out of their assigned role to apply the existing law as they
believed it to be. In a hypothetical case involving a robbery victim dropping dead of a heart
attack, 63% were willing to find first-degree murder (even though the law requires this in
only a few jurisdictions), and 60% were willing to uphold such a verdict as constitutional.
See id. at 166. About 50% of the subjects held accomplices of the gunman guilty of first-
degree murder. Id. at 167–68.
133 Though politicians frequently claim that their enactments are driven by public
demand, it is often the case that they are in fact the motivation behind the public opinion
itself. See infra Part III.B (describing studies identifying government as major source of
information for crime-related media coverage that shapes public perception about criminal
law). However, it is incontrovertible that they at least make the claim. See, e.g.,
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (1997) [hereinafter BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY]; David
Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strike” Laws on State and
Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
557, 568 (2000) (discussing public demand for “three strikes” laws in early 1990s and subse-
quent enactments championed by lawmakers acting in interests of those demanding stricter
laws); Stuntz, supra note 85, at 509 (“Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politi- R
cians respond with tougher sentences . . . and more criminal prohibitions.”). For an expan-
sive treatment of the numerous factors that can cause the public to support harsh crime
measures (and politicians to support them as well), see generally Sara Sun Beale, What’s
Law Got To Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 28–29,
31–32 (1997) [hereinafter Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It?].
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the citizens do not feel are criminal, or to assign excessively lengthy
sentences to crimes.134
A good deal of scholarship on the topic suggests that voter views
are a major force behind increases in criminal sentence lengths.135
Social scientists reviewing public opinion studies on criminal justice
matters comment that “[t]he influence of the public on policy in the
area of sentencing and parole should not be under-estimated. Many
sentencing commissions and judges are to some degree affected by
public pressure to make sentences harsher.”136 Sentencing commission
recommendations often must be enacted or approved by legislatures,
and legislators voting on these enactment bills are aware of voter
opinions.
Interestingly, however, another line of thinking regarding popular
concern for crime issues argues that, while there may be some latent
crime-control concerns present in the public consciousness, it would
be erroneous to conclude that public pressures often lead to harsher
criminal law enactments. Rather, it may be such that the reverse is
true: Expressed concern over and attention paid to crime issues by
politicians seems to spur public interest in the issue, thereby making it
seem as if voter demand has caused certain legislative enactments
when, in fact, the public may have been merely “riding the wave” of
concern actuated by a politician’s previous comments.137
Notwithstanding how they arrive at their desires, it seems clear at
first glance that voters do, in fact, desire higher sentences. Polling
studies frequently ask citizens some variation on the question of
whether they think sentences for crimes are too lenient, too harsh, or
about right. Consistently, those polled think that current sentences are
134 See generally Beale, What’s Law Got To Do With It?, supra note 133 (explaining how R
increase in crime rates during U.S. civil rights era led political campaigns to focus on crime
control by following public perception of crime skewed by media coverage and cognitive
errors such as overgeneralization of trends, overconfidence in opinions formed from min-
imal information, and availability of uniquely horrific cases to stand out as general exam-
ples of crimes); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831,
1847 (2005) (arguing that increased sentence lengths may be effort to displace criminal
activity by offering relatively harsher punishments compared with nearby jurisdictions).
135 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1713, 1718 (2006) (arguing that legislators increase criminal sentencing lengths to
appear responsive to demands of voters and interest groups); Schultz, supra note 133, at R
558 (stating that intense public support for “three strike” laws led to their passage in
twenty-two states and federally over two-year period).
136 JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE 197 (2000).
137 See BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY, supra note 133, at 78 (arguing that media repro- R
duction of official views on crime generates increased public support for punishment-
focused crime policies).
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too lenient and wish them to be harsher.138 Furthermore, citizens
report that a politician’s position on sentencing affects their vote:
About eighty percent of voters surveyed report that if a candidate
advocates tougher sentencing policies, they are more likely to vote for
that candidate.139
The results of these polls are widely reported; thus it would be
easy to conclude that politicians feel that they are doing the will of the
people when they vote for longer sentences for various crimes. It is
also the case that by doing so, they are avoiding being charged by
election-year opponents as “being soft on crime.” Still, this is not a
complete picture of the factors that shape public opinion regarding
criminal law, all of which combine to cause enactments that seem to
have popular support but for a number of reasons do not reflect the
actual preferences of the community. We will discuss a selection of
these factors in order to shed light on this conflict.
A. Media Omission of Facts Vital to Understanding Sentences
Current research suggests that there is a complex story behind
“what voters want.” It is often the case that voters are only informed
about the duration of sentences assigned in specific cases through
media reports, whether in print, on television, or via the Internet. In
one study, researchers asked Canadian and U.S. citizens to read sen-
tencing stories printed in newspapers, and then asked the study sub-
jects to judge the sentence given in each case.140 Large majorities of
readers reported that the sentences assigned in the cases were too
lenient and were quite confident in their ratings.141 The researchers
noted that most of the crime stories in newspapers were relatively
brief; the stories commonly reported the sentence given but generally
omitted or glossed over the reasoning underlying the assigned
sentences.142 The study found that “the modal reaction to these stories
was to regard the criminal sentences reported in them as too
lenient,”143 finding such a result in thirteen of the sixteen stories. Fur-
thermore, in spite of the fact that in the stories “[l]ittle information
138 Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27
CRIME & JUST. 1, 26–27 (2000).
139 Michael J. Hindelang, Public Opinion Regarding Crime, Criminal Justice, and
Related Topics, 11 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 101, 107–08 & tbl.4 (1974).
140 Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views of
Sentencing, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 454–56 (1990).
141 Id. at 456–57.
142 Id. at 464.
143 Id. at 456. Generally speaking, “the sentences reported by the newspapers . . . con-
firmed the a priori view held by most respondents that sentences are generally too
lenient.” Id.
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was conveyed on which to base a reasoned evaluation of the appropri-
ateness of the sentence,” the respondents reported a high degree of
confidence in their view that the sentences were too lenient.144
These findings are consistent with other studies. It appears likely
that media accounts of crimes are the source that voters generally use
to form their judgments on courtroom sentencing. By reading the
newspaper or watching television news accounts—which cover a dis-
proportionately high number of violent, as opposed to routine, crimes,
and which generally do not highlight extenuating circumstances or the
judge’s reasoning—readers and viewers quickly come to the conclu-
sion that the sentences assigned are too lenient. Reading further news
reports strengthens this conclusion. In fact, over ninety percent of
respondents in one study reported that media reports were their most
important source of information regarding the crime problem in
America today.145
This should make it clear that the media holds the central role in
shaping the public’s perception that sentencing is too lenient. Real-
izing this, Julian V. Roberts and Anthony N. Doob examined how the
public would perceive sentences if they had a different source of
accounts of the cases.146 These researchers derived an account of the
newspaper case from the official courtroom records, creating a sum-
mary from actual quotes from the proceedings or paraphrasing actual
documents. Importantly, the summary included much information
that is generally not found in news reports—the offender’s previous
convictions, a brief description of the offense, the defense’s and prose-
cution’s arguments regarding sentencing for the offender, a summary
of the presentence reports, and the final comments offered by the
judge.147
The study proceeded by separating the subjects into two groups:
One received a copy of the “court documents” account including all
relevant information, and a second matched sample of the subjects
received a newspaper account of the same crime. The two groups’
reactions to the material were vastly different. Whereas 63% of the
newspaper group thought that the sentence was too lenient,148 only
19% of the “court documents” group thought the sentence too
144 Id. at 457. “[I]n 58% of the ratings, subjects indicated that they were ‘very confident’
of their evaluations. In an additional 35%, subjects indicated they were ‘somewhat’ confi-
dent. In only 7% were subjects ‘not at all confident.’” Id. 
145 RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES 197
(2d ed. 1998).
146 Roberts & Doob, supra note 140, at 461. R
147 Id.
148 Id. at 462.
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lenient—while 52% thought it too harsh.149 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
those who read the “court documents” account evaluated the offense
as less serious and the offender as a better person than did subjects
who had read the newspaper story.150
Shari S. Diamond reports conceptually similar results.151 Studying
members of the public called for jury duty, she asked them to assign
sentences to hypothetical defendants whose crimes were presented in
some detail—again, unlike presentations given by the news media
alone.152 She found that the sentences given by these better-informed
subjects were very similar to the sentences recommended by prac-
ticing judges who responded to the same material.153 The takeaway
point from these studies is that at least part of the reason why the
public at large reports a desire for stricter criminal law is because they
are, in fact, underinformed about the actual nature of most crimes and
offenders. The nature of news reporting is in some ways antithetical to
disclosure of the whole fact pattern that leads to any particular crim-
inal sentence. After all, what is newsworthy is the sentencing itself,
not the actual cause therefor. With limited space in which to print or
report (coupled with a not-insignificant desire to simplify the news for
cross-demographic comprehension), news outlets end up leaving gaps
in the “whole story” behind any particular sentencing decision. These
gaps often cause people to assume that the sentence imposed was
simply too light, which, if it happens in enough cases, can entice
society at large to believe that a harsher set of sentencing guidelines
(or any other proposed legislation du jour) is necessary in order to
rectify the “problem” in criminal law.
B. Media Coverage of General Crime Issues with the Government
as an Information Source
As mentioned previously, the news media are the primary
sources of information that people rely on when judging the operation
of the criminal law. This would not be problematic if the news media
were able to provide a truly neutral and inclusive picture of the crim-
inal law. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As shown in the previous
subsection, the news media commonly skew perceptions of sentences
in individual criminal cases by not providing all of the relevant infor-
mation. Perhaps more significant, however, is the news media’s cov-
149 Id. at 462–63.
150 Id. at 463.
151 See Shari S. Diamond, Using Psychology To Control Law: From Deceptive Adver-
tising to Criminal Sentencing, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 239, 247–48 (1989).
152 Id.
153 Id.
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erage of general criminal issues, illustrated by specials highlighting the
“war on drugs” or by breaking news reports delivered whenever a
study reports an uptick in the crime rate. This coverage (and the innu-
merable examples of similar reports on other issues) is not by itself
problematic; it is the function of the news to report on what is impor-
tant and relevant to society. Rather, the larger issue in terms of the
media’s role in shaping public perceptions of the criminal law is trace-
able to the sources delivering the news to the media in the first place.
Though we often assume that the democratic process follows a pattern
beginning with news reports, which then shape public opinion, which
itself then shapes governmental action, studies have shown that this is
often not the case.
In fact, governmental actions are often the prime motivation
behind change in public opinion, spurred by popular news reports.
The ability of governmental sources “to supply frequent and conve-
niently formatted ‘news’ meant that the use of state sources also satis-
fied the organizational needs of news workers,” concludes Katherine
Beckett.154 Her study of news “packages” promoted to news agencies
by official sources found that, during four time periods in which all
crime-related stories printed in the New York Times, the Los Angeles
Times, and the Washington Post were analyzed for content, sixty-five
percent of all “packages” (that is, defined issues presented in certain
ways) reflected state sponsorship—reliance on a governmental agent
as the source of the news contained therein.155 An additional study
analyzing the sources behind drug-related television news reports in
the 1980s came to an even more striking conclusion: Seventy-six per-
cent of all news stories containing identified “packages” of informa-
tion about drugs and related criminality were attributable to state
sources.156
These studies, however, only tell half of the story. That the state
is a source of news is not shocking; it is perhaps not even surprising
that more than half of all crime-related news coverage is in some way
attributable to the government. Such involvement in newsmaking is
only relevant to a discussion of popular opinions regarding criminal
sentencing and policy if it can be shown that the news does not, in fact,
reflect preexisting concerns held by society as a whole. It is assumed
that legislators are responsive to the desires of society; the reasons
why this is so in a democracy are outside the scope of this discussion.
We cannot assume, however, that those societal desires are organic.
154 BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY, supra note 133, at 65. R
155 Id. at 75.
156 Id. at 76.
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 46  9-DEC-10 12:04
December 2010] THE DISUTILITY OF INJUSTICE 1985
We know that people on the whole are influenced by, and shape their
opinions according to, what is presented by the media. However, if the
picture painted by the media is itself a creation of the very legislators
who work to enact stricter criminal law, then they themselves are the
force behind those laws, not the demanding public. In other words, we
can conclude that governmental influence on the media contributes to
the enactment of legislation that deviates from community notions of
desert if we can show that public interest in the crime-related
problems reported by the media lags behind the news reports—thus
showing that the government-provided information has a hand in
causing said interest—rather than preceding them.
In many instances, this is in fact the case. While we cannot con-
clude that a media report can cause any particular change in the opin-
ions of the public, “it is undoubtedly a crucial component of the
context in which political opinions are formed. It is quite likely that
the media’s reproduction of the official view of crime and drugs
played an important role in generating support for crime and drug
policies” that were advocated by politicians in power at the time of
the study.157 Between 1964 and 1974 (the first timeframe analyzed in
the Beckett study), political initiatives and media coverage were
strongly correlated with public concern about crime—and the concern
only arose after the political moves were initiated.158 In contrast, the
actual crime rate was not correlated with public concern.159 In the
second analyzed time frame (1985–1992), the study found that polit-
ical initiatives regarding drug laws were strongly correlated with
public concern over the drug problem—but that the actual rate of
drug use was not.160
We must be careful not to make too much of these studies, how-
ever. Politicians and the media are not the only factors influencing
public opinion, and it certainly is not the case that politicians always
lead the public by the nose—public opinion and the actions of politi-
cians are more likely mutually reinforcing,161 and the demands of elec-
tions will generally make political actors at least try to do what the
public demands. Still, the evidence is striking: In June 1993, only 7%
of respondents in a national poll identified crime as the nation’s most
important problem; by August 1994, this percentage had increased to
52%.162 Amazingly, this increase contradicted the crime trends at the
157 Id. at 78.
158 Id. at 21.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 22.
161 Id. at 23.
162 Id. at 25.
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time; victimization studies indicated that most types of crime
decreased in prevalence over that time frame. However, then-
President Clinton’s January 1994 State of the Union address spent sig-
nificant time addressing the crime problem in the country,163 and—
most importantly—one of the country’s most significant crime-control
bills, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,164
was debated in Congress and passed that year. There is no doubt that
these political events contributed significantly to the rise in public
concern over crime policy that occurred between 1993 and 1994.
In sum, it is clear that the media are prime motivators of public
opinion. While it is often assumed that the media reports objective
fact and unbiased information, this may not always be the case. It is
problematic, then, to assume that politicians are strictly responsive to
the will of the people. Though public opinion may seem to demand
stricter crime-control laws, it may simply be that it has been shaped by
the very politicians claiming merely to follow public opinion. The pre-
vious sections noted that public opinion regarding individual instances
of sentencing would be significantly different if the public were able to
consider the entire set of facts behind the decision. It is not too far a
leap to conclude that public demands regarding stricter criminal laws
would be different if the public were given similarly inclusive and
unbiased accounts of the more general criminal statutes and proposals
in force at any given time. Finally, while politicians claim to be respon-
sive to public demands by enacting harsher criminal penalties, this
may be less than true. Evidence exists to show that public interest in
crime policy follows rather than causes legislative activity. To unequiv-
ocally state that harsher criminal enactments are simply a response to
public demand, therefore, is to mischaracterize the situation.
C. Assuming Headline Crimes To Be Paradigmatic
As mentioned previously, the media are the chief sources upon
which the public bases its opinions regarding criminal law. Another
related reason why citizens tend to think that criminal sentences are
too lenient involves the ways citizens imagine the crime when they
answer the opinion poll asking “whether penalties for crimes are too
163 President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union 126, 127, 133–35 (Jan. 25, 1994), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1994_public_papers_vol1_text&docid=pap_text-64.pdf.
164 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796; see also Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal
Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice
Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1407–08 (2006) (describing Act as “the largest single
crime bill in history”).
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lenient, too severe, or about right.” Recall that the majority of citizens
choose the “too lenient” answer to this question.  Evidence suggests
that when asked this question, people bring to mind violent crimes,
and this is disproportionately done by those who give the “too
lenient” answer.165 One cause for this distortion is the reality that only
the most heinous or most significant crimes receive significant news
coverage.
When a citizen thinks about the appropriate sentence for a crime,
he calls to mind a prototype or exemplar of the crime. The citizen
does not do what the legislative system must do, which is to consider
the necessary and sufficient conditions for having committed that
crime. That is, the law must specify what counts as, for instance,
murder or rape. If the citizen is judging whether “life” is an appro-
priate prison sentence for “murder,” she will imagine her prototype of
a violent murder and report that, indeed, life is the appropriate sen-
tence. Yet that does not mean that she thinks that life in prison is the
just sentence for a person who brings to an end the life of her termi-
nally ill husband who is in terrible pain, for example. In fact, the cit-
izen would be shocked at the severity of the sentence in that instance,
despite it being an example of “murder.”
There is a systematic distortion here, because the prototype of
the crime that the citizen brings to mind is the clear, unqualified case
of deliberate murder, and not the cases of murder that would require
qualifying descriptions about how they occurred. In other words,
when thinking of murder cases, the citizen does not consider mercy
killings or killings done under provocation. Such distortions of the
content of specific offenses occur for other crimes besides murder, as
well. The dynamic is exacerbated by the fact that news coverage
presents a somewhat misleading perspective of the frequency with
which such dramatic crimes occur. In one analysis, 25% of media
crime stories were about murder, yet murder is involved in less than
1% of crimes.166
Additionally, this “over-broadening of the category” can occur
when a certain sort of law is passed. The most salient example is found
in the expansion of sex-offender laws. When a terrible incident occurs,
such as a child being kidnapped, sexually molested, and perhaps even-
tually killed, legislators may feel that public opinion demands a hard-
ening of the criminal penalties that can be mobilized if similar
incidents occur in the future. Further, some continuation of confine-
ment for “mentally-ill offenders” is often mandated after sexual
165 Roberts & Doob, supra note 140, at 464–65. R
166 Id. at 452.
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offenders have completed their prison terms167—and once committed,
offenders are almost never released.168 Finally, laws may be enacted
to prohibit the freed offender from living within various distances of
spots where children may congregate.169
The prototype of the sexual offense—the kidnapping and rape of
a child—that comes to mind when people think of the sexual offender
may justly warrant the sentence just described. However, the sexual
offender laws, as they are currently written, often criminalize a
number of actions that are morally quite distant from the prototype.
For example, in New Jersey, a teenage person who has sexual inter-
course with another teenage person who is just under the legal age of
consent has committed a sexual offense.170 In this instance the offense
is “criminal sexual contact,” because the victim is a minor. Despite the
striking dissimilarity between this crime and the paradigmatic sex
offense, both will be referred to as such under the law.
However, news media reporting of the legislature’s movement
toward passing sexual offender laws, not surprisingly, continues to
invoke the actual case that triggered the legislature into action. The
reports pay much less attention to other, less offensive cases that
would also fall under the scope of the law. Therefore, the public does
not focus on whether the scope of the proposed laws will be overly
broad and inflict too-severe sentences on persons who commit less
167 Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN.
L. REV. 670, 703 (2008) (“In 1990, Washington became the first state to pass a modern law
allowing for involuntary commitment of ‘sexually violent predators.’ Other states quickly
followed suit, and there are currently twenty states with some version of an SVPA
[Sexually Violent Predators Act].”). For an example of statutes authorizing civil confine-
ment post-sentence-completion, see Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18
U.S.C. § 4248 (2006); Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 207 (West 2008) (invalidated by United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.
2009), but upheld as constitutional by United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009));
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29 (West Supp. 2009) (amended 2010).
168 Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the
Behavioral Sciences, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 10 (2000).
169 Consider this description of the relevant Georgia state law:
The law, described when it was adopted in 2006 as the nation’s toughest
restriction on sex offenders, prohibited them from living within 1,000 feet of
schools, churches or any other place that children might congregate, including
more than 150,000 school bus stops in the state. The ban applied even when a
school, a church or the like opened in an area where an offender was already
living.
Brenda Goodman, Georgia Justices Overturn a Curb on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2007, at A26 (referencing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (West Supp. 2009), which was held
unconstitutional in Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections, 653 S.E.2d 740, 745
(2007), to extent that it permits taking of property without just compensation).
170 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3 (West 2005).
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morally repugnant crimes. The unjust consequences of these new laws
are downplayed and thereby hidden from public view.
What emerges is an account of sentencing policies that is much
more complicated than it seems at first glance. The standard account
holds that the legislatures are doing “the will of the people” when
they pass “harsh measures” against crimes. The real mechanisms
involved are much more nuanced. Social and political scientists sug-
gest that when citizens are asked relatively simple questions about
crimes, they respond in terms of their momentary interpretations of
the question. To answer, they think of the crimes that they have seen
in the media, which are usually violent crimes presented in dramatic
and one-sided terms.  They use their answers about sentence duration
to make the point that crime is bad and deserves sanction. However,
when the question set gives the citizens the opportunity to give a more
tempered and nuanced view of what to do about crimes, they take that
chance.171 A more nuanced presentation of the crime at hand inevi-
tably leads to a more nuanced liability judgment by the person asked.
To summarize, a third dynamic arises from citizens’ tendencies to
think about crimes using the prototypes of crimes that are quickly and
automatically recalled when a crime category is discussed. Here, the
prototype is generally a “perfect” version of the category—a murder,
for example, is a highly deliberate killing of an innocent victim, and
not the more complex mix of intention, provocation, and human error
that is the case with many nonparadigmatic murders. By conceptual-
izing the question about penalty severity as an inquiry into the appro-
priate severity of penalties that should be assigned to the prototype
versions of a crime, citizens tend to signal a desire for more severe
penalties in general. This masks the fact that a citizen is really only
expressing a desire for relatively severe penalties being assigned to the
“perfect” (and thus most severe) instances of these crimes. Yet, the
resulting sentencing statutes allow for those harsher sentences to be
assigned for much lesser forms of the offense, and the public remains
unaware.
D. Public Fear
People’s opinions about the sentences required for proper crim-
inal punishment fluctuate as a function of their current perceptions of
the threat of crimes and, more generally, their state of fear. If, as the
news media can make happen, people feel that the threat of crime is
171 Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How Including
Retributive Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice Procedures, 19 SOC.
JUST. RES. 395, 421 (2006).
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high, they will report that criminals need to be locked away to reduce
that threat. Long sentences are a way to reduce the threat of crime.
People express a desire for crime to be controlled when they answer
that sentences are too lenient, and, at the moment they answer, they
perceive increasing the duration of sentences as one way of achieving
that end.172
The point here is that people take different perspectives in
answering the questions that they are asked in surveys depending on
their perceptions of crime rates, whether or not their perceptions are
actually correct. Perhaps more importantly, people tend to generalize
their feelings toward crime overall when answering questions about
specific crimes. If they are asked these questions when they are prima-
rily concerned with conveying the message that they want more atten-
tion paid to crime prevention, then they will answer all questions
about actions that they perceive as having a crime prevention compo-
nent favorably. Thus, they may report that they support “harsher
prison sentences” but would think, if they were to stop and reflect,
that some of the specific examples of harsh sentences are actually
unduly harsh and thus unjust. However, this is not the question they
perceive themselves as answering. Instead, they see themselves as
expressing approval of policies that incapacitate criminals by incarcer-
ating them or policies that seek to deter criminal conduct among the
general population.
Further, studies have demonstrated that people report support
for deterrence and incapacitation as crime control practices.173 Here,
we are making an importantly different argument than in other sec-
tions. In the previous sections, we generally suggested that the public
was in some sense being misled, often by mass media reports, into
supporting sentences that would be unjust. Now, we suggest that the
public sometimes construes questions concerning sentencing practices
as questions about their favorability toward achieving crime control
overall, without factoring in their own judgments about appropriate
sentence durations or their sense of the injustice of draconian
sentences. Put simply, if any person has a general desire for more
“crime control,” he will tend to consistently answer that crimes should
172 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 771–79 (1990) (arguing that politicians will
endorse policies because of public preference formed from miscalculations of risk); Rachel
E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1292
(2005) (“[T]he public’s fears of crimes will be fueled by the media, and they will perhaps
place greater stock in incarceration policies that promise to deal with their fears in the
most immediate fashion.”).
173 Kevin M. Carlsmith, On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and
Actions, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 119, 133 (2008).
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have stricter punishments, without stopping to consider that perhaps
some current punishments are already strict enough—or too strict.
Another related effect of high levels of public fear or concern is
the passage of “designer laws” designed to address very specific
events that have been widely reported or that enter the popular con-
sciousness. Imagine, for example, a brutal attack on a mother and
child, committed by polo-clad youths pretending to practice their golf
swings in a public park. Media coverage is unrelenting, saturating the
airwaves with updates on the case and with other reports of intimida-
tion by nine-iron. Though the vast majority of teenagers merely want
to work on their short game, concerned citizens demand legal action
to counter the heavily publicized threat. Out of concern for the sensi-
bilities of the public (and wanting to look “tough on crime”), legisla-
tors “view these incidents with alarm” and criminalize possession of a
golf club or other “weaponized sporting equipment” inside of certain
“safety zones,” such as within a half-mile of any school or public park.
The penalty for possession, of course, is severe—in fact, many demand
that all instances of “criminal possession of a golf club” be punished as
severely as was the assault that triggered the public’s outrage in the
first place. Sadly, this scenario is less farfetched than it seems. Legisla-
tures have passed numerous harsh criminal statutes as direct
responses to fear based on coverage of a crime that captures the
public consciousness174—often disregarding prior legislative enact-
ments that already criminalize the covered activity. The consequences
of such new, fear- or panic-driven legislation are often disastrous.175
174 For instance, Garland notes:
Many of the laws passed in the 1990s—Megan’s law, Three Strikes, sexual
predator statutes, the reintroduction of children’s prisons, paedophile registers,
and mandatory sentences . . . are designed to be expressive, cathartic actions,
undertaken to denounce the crime and reassure the public. . . . Typically these
measures are passed amidst great public outrage in the wake of sensational
crimes of violence, often involving a disturbingly archetypal confrontation
between a poorly controlled dangerous criminal and an innocent, defenceless
middle-class victim.
GARLAND, supra note 12, at 133. R
175 Many of these sorts of ad hoc additions to criminal laws, generated in haste in
response to a perceived public demand, criminalize actions that are already criminalized in
the general sections of the criminal code and do so in ways that are inconsistent with the
penalties set for the acts in the general codes, thereby generating considerable legal com-
plexities. See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 637–38 (2005) (describing how pressure
from interest groups leads to criminalization of offenses already covered by general provi-
sions and arguing that redundant offenses make code interpretation confusing for public
and law enforcement alike); see also GARLAND, supra note 12, at 103–38 (describing recent R
change in correctional policy and factors behind these new penalogical aims).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\85-6\NYU603.txt unknown Seq: 53  9-DEC-10 12:04
1992 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1940
E. Next-Election Vulnerability
During the 1970s and 1980s, a powerful, specific version of the
law and economics perspective emerged and quickly gained adher-
ents. It is called the “public choice perspective,” and it helps illumi-
nate why legislators in general will sometimes vote for measures that
they know are bad ones from a public policy standpoint and, specifi-
cally, will vote for draconian sentencing legislation.176 The basic
assumption of the public choice perspective, applied to legislators, is
that legislators, like any political actor, will rationally maximize their
own self-interest.177 In other words, when we elect a legislator, we
have not created a saint who will consistently work for the public
good; we have instead positioned a personally ambitious person into a
seat in the legislature from which he or she will keep a keen eye on his
or her own personal interests.178
As indicated by public choice theorists, one such interest is in get-
ting re-elected. The legislator faces the need to raise money for
increasingly expensive re-election campaigns and to take legislative
stands that will attract voter support in later elections. The fact that
campaigns are expensive can be useful for the incumbent legislator,
since it provides a high barrier to entry for candidates running against
the incumbent. Therefore, one task of the incumbent is to cast votes
that do the bidding of various interest groups. The interest groups’
task is to “pay off” the legislator for a favorable vote. The payoffs can
be campaign contributions, votes that the interest group can mobilize
for the candidate, or implicit promises of future campaign contribu-
tions179 (and sometimes—a current favorite—a promise of a lobbying
position in the interest group organization or in lobbying firms the
interest group controls after the politician leaves office).180
176 To get a sense of the public choice position, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A
MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 193–95 (2006). As Tamanaha remarks:
“The primary objective of politicians is to ensure their own reelection.” Id. at 193.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 194.
179 Id. at 193–94 (“A great deal of legislation . . . involves legally imposed and sanc-
tioned transfers of wealth secured by well-financed and organized interest groups at the
expense of hapless groups or the unorganized in society. Legislators are paid by benefi-
ciaries of the legislation they produce . . . .”).
180 The eventual ability to transition from a legislative position to a more secure and
better-paid position as a functionary in the network of organizations whose interests the
legislator has served is important here. It provides security well past that experienced by
legislators who have to be re-elected at intervals, and it also provides a monetary return
that compensates the former legislator for a number of years receiving a merely adequate
public salary. The classic example involves the legislator voting for ultra-expensive defense
projects that would benefit the different defense contractors with plants in his legislative
district.
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Commonly, a legislator’s primary goal is to remain in office. Even
when considering a post-legislature career, the legislator will be more
valuable to an interest group if he has served several terms in the leg-
islature. So, not surprisingly, the successful legislator is alert to occa-
sions or actions that might derail his ability to accumulate campaign
funds or attract votes in coming elections. Votes on criminal codes and
sentence durations have the possibility of causing such derailment.
We have already mentioned one way of stating the problem:
allowing an opponent to cast one’s voting record as “soft on crime.”
The dynamic that links citizens’ apparent support of harsh sentencing,
detailed above, to legislative increases in prison sentences is the legis-
lators’ concern in being perceived as “soft on crime” and thus vulner-
able to attack by opponents during election cycles.181 Negative
campaigning involving distortions of the meaning of incumbents’
voting patterns is a well-known political phenomenon, and it would
make sense for a politician to go to considerable lengths to avoid
leaving any voting record that could make him or her vulnerable to
such charges—after all, no politician wants to be seen as supporting
the “crime lobby.”182 How often these negative attacks happen in
practice is not clear, but the knowledge of their possibility may be
enough for many politicians to be leery of associating with crime legis-
lation that does anything else but treat crime harshly.183 This fear of
being seen as “soft on crime” is a self-perpetuating cycle—if no party
is willing to risk such a label, sentencing standards will only spiral
181 Hindelang, supra note 139, at 108. R
182 See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 16 (2008) (describing political parties’ competition to appear hard on crime). The
commonly cited example of this kind of campaign is the “Willie Horton” ads that associ-
ated Governor Dukakis (who, at the time, was running for President against eventual
winner George H.W. Bush) with the prison furloughing of a criminal who committed a
murder while on release. See generally STEVE TAKESIAN, WILLIE HORTON: TRUE CRIME
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2002).
183 This fear of looking “soft on crime” has implications even outside of crime policy
proper; that is, politicians may want to vote against crime bills because they are bad policy,
or because of some other concern, such as constitutionality—but the fear of attack is too
salient to allow such a vote.
[A] federal officeholder who votes against a federal car-jacking law will likely
be characterized by the officeholder’s opponent as soft on crime. Although the
officeholder might respond to the attack ad with a discussion of how the vote
was motivated by federalism concerns, the officeholder may rightly be con-
cerned that the defense may be too nuanced to be effective in a thirty-second
sound bite. The officeholder may legitimately want to avoid the risk of having
to expend scarce campaign funds in responding to such an ad altogether.
See, e.g., William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process
Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 152 (1998).
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upward, whether or not that outcome is in accord with community
views.184
A second force is also operating. Politicians planning to seek re-
election are often wary of crossing “single issue voters.” In general,
the current perception of the average voter is as one who does not
closely attend to the politician’s pattern of voting on the multitudes of
individual bills that they consider. Some voters are “single issue”
voters—whether or not they vote for any particular candidate
depends wholly on that candidate’s stance on one issue alone. For
instance, voters who think that abortion is murder will tend to vote
against any candidate who fails to support the various proposals for
laws that limit, restrict, or otherwise move toward making abortions
impossible. In this instance, the situation for the legislator may be
symmetric in that there also may be voters who will vote against any
candidate who supports bills restricting abortions.
F. Summary
The reader should by now realize that public opinion is subject to
the influence of many factors, none of which can be definitively identi-
fied as primary but all of which have some effect. Unfortunately, as a
result, the true feelings of the population are not always reflected in
legislative activity or even in public opinion polls. The influence of the
media in shaping public opinion often causes people to profess opin-
ions that they would not hold if given all of the information in any
particular case. People’s generalization of crime opinions, and their
construction of crime archetypes upon which they base their sen-
tencing judgments, often simplify their thinking to the point that,
because only the worst crimes are reported and come to mind, they,
when polled, often want to impose only the worst punishments. As
such, any particular legislator can look to this flawed public opinion
and conclude that the majority support harsher crime laws, when in
fact they do not.
Another reason for the passage of legislation that can conflict
with desert is the nature of the democratic process on the whole. The
media’s crime reporting is often based on information provided by the
government—and, as discussed, public concern about crime often fol-
lows legislative consideration of crime issues, rather than being the
cause of said action. Additionally, the legislators’ self-preservation
184 For a general discussion of the upward spiral that characterizes American criminal
law enactments, see Stuntz, supra note 85, at 509. See also Erik Luna, The Overcriminal- R
ization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005) (discussing trend of increased criminal-
ization as abuse of criminal justice system).
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interest dictates that they not put themselves in a position that could
be vulnerable to attack by a rival—a situation that can be brought
about by advocating sentencing reduction or opposing harsher penal-
ties, even if such reforms would be in accord with empirical desert.
The takeaway point here is this: Although we cannot pinpoint
one single reason why the democratic legislative process produces
crime laws that conflict with the intuitions of justice of the community,
we can point to a number of factors that work together to cause such
results. These outcomes do happen. Laws passed are often not in
accord with the community’s sense of justice, as Study 1 reported in
Part II makes clear. Knowing some of the reasons why this happens,
however, may help us to avoid such deviant enactments in the future.
Doing so would harness more of the benefits of keeping the law in
accord with shared community perceptions of justice and would
reduce the harmful consequences of deviations from desert.
IV
TESTING THE CRIMINOGENIC EFFECTS OF INJUSTICE:
STUDIES 2A AND 2B
As we have argued elsewhere, there are good arguments to sug-
gest that there is significant utility in distributing liability and punish-
ment according to people’s shared intuitions of justice—perhaps
greater than the utility of distributing liability and punishment in the
traditional utilitarian manner (to optimize deterrence, rehabilitation,
or incapacitation).185 We will briefly summarize these “utility of
desert” arguments.
First, some of the system’s power to control conduct derives from
its potential to stigmatize violators. With some potential offenders this
is a more powerful, yet essentially cost-free, control mechanism when
compared to imprisonment. Yet the system’s ability to stigmatize
depends upon its moral credibility with the community. That is, for a
conviction to trigger community stigmatization, the law must have
earned a reputation for following the community’s view on what does
and does not deserve moral condemnation. Liability and punishment
rules that deviate from a community’s shared intuitions of justice
undercut this reputation.
Second, the effective operation of the criminal justice system
depends upon the cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of those
involved in it—offenders, judges, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors,
185 For a fuller account of the argument, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES,
supra note 5, at 175–210, Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, and R
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 100. R
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police, and others. To the extent that people see the system as
unjust—as in conflict with their intuitions about justice—acquiescence
and cooperation are likely to fade and be replaced with subversion
and resistance. Vigilantism may be the most dramatic reaction to a
perceived failure of justice, but a host of other less dramatic (but more
common) forms of resistance and subversion have shown themselves.
Jurors may disregard their jury instructions. Police officers, prosecu-
tors, and judges may make up their own rules. Witnesses may lose
incentives to offer their information or testimony. And offenders may
be inspired to fight adjudication and correctional processes rather
than participate in and acquiesce to them.
Perhaps the greatest utility of desert comes through a more subtle
but potentially more influential mechanism. The real power to gain
compliance with society’s rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the
threat of official criminal sanction but in the influence of the inter-
twined forces of social and individual moral control. The networks of
interpersonal relationships in which people find themselves, the social
norms and prohibitions shared among those relationships and trans-
mitted through social networks, and the internalized representations
of norms and moral precepts control people’s conduct. The law is not
irrelevant to these social and personal forces. Criminal law, in partic-
ular, plays a central role in creating and maintaining the social con-
sensus necessary for sustaining moral norms. In fact, in a society as
diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only society-wide mecha-
nism that transcends cultural and ethnic differences. Thus, the crim-
inal law’s most important real-world effect may be its ability to assist
in the building, shaping, and maintaining of shared norms and moral
principles. Criminal law can contribute to and harness the compliance-
producing power of interpersonal relationships and personal morality
but will only be effective in doing so if it has sufficient credibility.
Finally, the criminal law can gain compliance with its commands
through another mechanism as well: If it earns a reputation as a reli-
able statement of what the community perceives as condemnable,
people are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authorita-
tive and as appropriate to follow in those borderline cases in which
the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind
of the actor. The importance of this role should not be underesti-
mated; in a society with the complex interdependencies that charac-
terize ours, a seemingly harmless action can have destructive
consequences. When the action is criminalized by the legal system,
one would want the citizen to respect the law, even though he or she
does not immediately intuit why that action is banned. Such deference
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will be facilitated if citizens believe that the law is an accurate guide to
appropriate prudential and moral behavior.
The extent of the criminal law’s effectiveness in all these
respects—in bringing the power of stigmatization to bear, in avoiding
resistance and subversion to a system perceived as unjust, in facili-
tating, communicating, and maintaining societal consensus on what is
and is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in borderline cases
through deference to its moral authority—is to a great extent depen-
dent on the degree to which criminal law has gained moral credibility
in the minds of the citizens governed by it. Thus, criminal law’s moral
credibility is essential to effective crime control and is enhanced if the
distribution of criminal liability is perceived as “doing justice”—that
is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways that the community
perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of justice. Conversely,
the system’s moral credibility, and therefore its crime-control effec-
tiveness, is undermined by a distribution of liability that deviates from
community perceptions of just desert.
Studies 2a and 2b were designed to test for evidence that reduced
moral credibility in the criminal justice system produces disillusion-
ment that in turn could undermine the deference described above.
Specifically, these studies examine whether knowledge of the extent
to which existing criminal law doctrines deviate from ordinary intu-
itions of justice can affect people’s general respect for the law, as well
as their intention to cooperate, support, and comply with it. We
hypothesized that, where criminal law doctrines deviate dramatically
from ordinary intuitions about justice, such awareness of the law’s
predictable injustices would indeed negatively affect people’s attitudes
toward the law, as well as weaken their behavioral intentions to coop-
erate, support, and comply with it.
A. Study 2a Design and Methodology
We ran two studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 2a, 59 subjects
(34 female, 25 male; age range of 18–77) were recruited to participate
in a short web survey by two separate means. An invitation to go to a
website to participate in the study was circulated to the University of
Pennsylvania Law School community and other acquaintances, with a
request that people in turn send the invitation to their acquaintances.
(Students were excluded from participation.) Eventually, 26 subjects
from this source took the online survey. None of these people knew of
the study beforehand, its goals or its design, nor who was involved in
its design. (As reported below, the results from these subjects did not
differ in any significant way from the results obtained from other sub-
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jects.) The remaining 33 subjects were recruited via Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk system186 and were paid $0.95 for their participation.
This system coordinates a large pool of paid volunteers who perform
tasks over the Internet (including many other tasks besides surveys)
for a wide range of requesters. All subjects were assured that their
data would be kept anonymous.
Study 2a used a simple pre-post design. Subjects were first asked
a series of questions to assess their general attitudes and behavioral
intentions with regard to the criminal justice system. Their responses
to these questions comprised the baseline responses. They were then
exposed to a set of cases in which the criminal justice system in a
hypothetical jurisdiction gave liability and punishment that was
unjust—either too high or too low. All cases and results were real but
were not from any single jurisdiction. Subjects were then asked the
same set of questions regarding their views to be answered on the
assumption that they lived in that hypothetical jurisdiction. The ques-
tion of interest was whether subjects’ answers to the questions based
on living in the hypothetical criminal justice system would differ from
their earlier baseline answers under the current criminal justice
system.
The eight questions of greatest interest for present purposes are
reproduced in Table 5 below. A subset of these questions—Questions
1, 2, and 3—examines the extent to which people regard the criminal
law, whose norms they are likely to internalize, as a reliable source of
moral authority. A second subset—Questions 4, 5, and 6—examines
people’s willingness to cooperate with and assist in the operation of
the criminal justice system. For instance, these questions shed light on
how willing people are to report conduct deemed criminal, even
though it may not seem particularly condemnable to them. A third
subset—Questions 7 and 8—examines people’s intentions to comply
with the criminal law’s rules in morally grey areas.187 All questions
were to be answered on a 9-point scale, which asked subjects to rate
their level of agreement with each statement, ranging from 1:
“strongly disagree” to 9: “strongly agree,” with interim points for “dis-
agree,” “agree,” and “unsure.” As is typical with such scales, most
186 Mechanical Turk is an online system run by Amazon that enables researchers (as
well as other entities) to recruit individuals to perform various tasks for payment.  The
tasks that can be performed include, but are not limited to, surveys such as the one we
conducted. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
(last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
187 We also asked four other questions that pertained to similar issues. However, these
were not affected by the manipulation in that they did not show any pre-post stimulation
differences, so we do not discuss them further.
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subjects avoided the extremes and answered within the range of 3:
“disagree” to 7: “agree.” The questions were presented at the begin-
ning of the survey in a new random order for each subject.
TABLE 5
QUESTIONS ON THE EFFECT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM’S MORAL CREDIBILITY
Question: Agree or Disagree?
1. Life sentence means offense conduct must be heinous
You see a story on the evening news about a prisoner who was sentenced to life in
prison. Based on his extremely harsh sentence, you would conclude that the person must
have committed a heinous crime, and believe that he deserves the punishment that he got.
2. Law prohibition means posting false comments must be condemnable
You learn from a newspaper story that posting false negative comments on another
person’s online profile site (e.g. Facebook) can count as an act of criminal libel. Based on
the criminal law’s prohibition of this act, you would consider it to be condemnable.
3. High sentence for financial maneuver means condemnable
Your newspaper reports that a particular financial maneuver on taxes has just been
made a crime and that the law has assigned it a very serious sentence of 28 to 32 years.
Because the law assigns such a high sentence, you would conclude that the conduct must
be morally condemnable and probably deserves such a sentence.
4. Report removal of arrowhead
You learn of a person in your town who has illegally taken an arrowhead from an
important historical site which they visited. It is illegal to take anything from the site. You
would report the removal to the relevant authorities.
5. Give found handgun to police
You are walking through an alley and find a hand gun next to a sewer drain. You think
it might not be safe for children to leave it there, but you worry that picking it up and
carrying it to police might create problems for you. No one is around to see what you are
doing. You would pick up the gun and take it to the police.
6. Report dog violation to authorities
Your neighbor is a dog lover. He recently got three more dogs, for a total of six. The
law only allows 3 dogs in a single home. You might report the neighbor’s new dogs to the
relevant authorities.
7. Go back and report your mistake to gas station
While on vacation, in a place that is distant from the one you live in, you drive off from
a gas station without paying. You realize this later, but you also know that the employees
could have no knowledge of your identity, and that you would not be traceable. You have
the possibility to turn back and report your mistake, but you are somewhat concerned that
this act itself would lead to some penalty. You would turn back or attempt to contact the
gas station to correct for your mistake.
8. Go back and report your mistake to restaurant
While on vacation, in a place that is distant from the one you live in, you drive off from
a restaurant without paying. You realize this later, but you also know that the employees
could have no knowledge of your identity, and that you would not be traceable. You have
the possibility to turn back and report your mistake, but you are somewhat concerned that
this act itself would lead to some penalty. You would turn back or attempt to contact the
restaurant to correct for your mistake.
Having responded to these questions to establish a baseline, sub-
jects were then presented with seven real-world cases, for which pilot
testing had shown that the liability or sentence actually given in the
case deviated dramatically from ordinary intuitions. The cases are
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described in Appendix C in the order in which they were presented.
Several of these cases engage the crime-control doctrines described
above. Subjects were instructed truthfully that all of the cases and
sentences were real. They read each case and assigned a sentence that
they thought was appropriate, if any, from a drop-down menu of
sentences.188
The actual sentences assigned to these cases were then revealed
to the subjects,189 with instructions reminding them that these
sentences had all come from real-life cases. It was not explicitly
revealed to subjects that all of the cases had in fact occurred within
the American criminal justice system. Instead, subjects were
instructed to assume that all of the cases had come from a single,
hypothetical criminal justice system, and that they should try to form
an impression of this system as a whole.
Out of the seven cases, five (cases 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 in Appendix C)
had real-world sentences much more severe than most people judged
appropriate, whereas the remaining two (cases 2 and 6) received no
sentence, though most people answered that a serious sentence should
be imposed. For each case in turn, the computer program that admin-
istered the survey (Qualtrics) revealed the actual sentence to subjects,
as well as the sentence that the subject had previously assigned. Sub-
jects were asked to calculate the difference between the two sentences
and to enter it on the screen. This exercise was meant to focus the
subjects’ attention on the difference between their own intuitions and
the sentences actually imposed in the hypothetical system.
Subjects next responded to the same set of questions that were
asked in the first part of the survey, set out in Table 5, which assessed
their general attitudes and intentions towards the criminal justice
system (this time in a new random order). They were instructed to
respond to these questions as if they were living in the hypothetical
criminal justice system which had assigned the liability and sentences
they had just seen.
Our specific hypothesis was that learning about the injustices cre-
ated by the current criminal justice system (described to subjects as a
hypothetical system), including those created by current crime-control
doctrines like those tested in Study 1, would undermine the system’s
moral credibility and have the detrimental effects on attitudes rele-
188 The options presented to subjects were as follows: Death, Life, 30 years, 26 years,
22.5 years, 19 years, 15 years, 13 years, 11 years, 9 years, 7 years, 6 years, 5 years, 4 years, 3
years, 2.5 years, 2 years, 1.5 years, 1 year, 10.5 months, 9 months, 7.5 months, 6 months, 5
months, 4 months, 3 months, 2 months, 6.5 weeks, 5 weeks, 3.5 weeks, 2 weeks, 11 days, 1
week, 4 days, 1 day, Liability but no punishment, No punishment.
189 See Column 4 of Appendix C.
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vant to crime control described above. We predicted that when
responding to questions about how they would think and act if they
were living in the hypothetical system, subjects would be less inclined
to defer to the criminal law and less inclined to cooperate and comply
with it.
The hypothetical system framing was derived from recent
research on the “hypothetical society paradigm.”190 We framed our
study in this way because we surmised that most people have strong
existing beliefs about the justness of their own criminal justice system,
having lived within that system for many years; thus, experimenters
could not reasonably expect to change such beliefs in a few minutes.
Moreover, owing to a desire to respond consistently, most individuals
would probably be reluctant to indicate that their own beliefs and
intentions had changed in the course of a single survey session. The
hypothetical system framing is useful in liberating subjects to express
what is more likely to be an accurate appraisal of their own beliefs and
intentions with full knowledge of the conditions described in that
system (which happens to be the current one).
At the conclusion of the survey, subjects responded to a series of
standard demographic items. They also responded to two general
questions (on a 9-point scale) about the hypothetical criminal justice
system. The first of these asked: “Do you think that the hypothetical
criminal justice system whose cases you have just seen gives people
the punishment that they deserve, no more, no less?” where 1 was:
“Not at all—the criminal law in that system does very badly,” the mid-
point, 5, was: “The criminal law in that system does neither well nor
badly,” and 9 was: “To a great extent—the criminal law in that system
does very well.” The second general question asked subjects to indi-
cate their agreement with the following statement: “The hypothetical
criminal justice system does a reliable job of doing justice and would
have credibility with the citizens it governs,” where 1 was “strongly
disagree,” 3 was “disagree,” the midpoint 5 was “unsure,” 7 was
“agree,” and 9 was “strongly agree.”
B. Study 2a Results and Discussion
The two subject pools were somewhat different demographically.
The first group (the emailed invitation sample) was consistently older,
better educated, and wealthier than the Mechanical Turk sample.
190 Gregory Mitchell & Phillip E. Tetlock, Experimental Political Philosophy: Justice
Judgments in the Hypothetical Society Paradigm, in EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Jon A. Krosnick & I-Chant A. Chiang eds.) (forthcoming May 2011), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912981.
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There were no statistically significant differences in political views,
belief in a God, or in the gender composition of the two samples. Most
importantly, the two groups did not differ in their response to learning
about the unjust sentencing outcomes of the hypothetical system—
there was no reliable variation in pre-post stimulation differences
when comparing the two groups. Hence, we collapse the two groups in
the following analyses.
As Appendix C shows, the average sentences imposed by subjects
were dramatically different from the actual sentences imposed by the
criminal justice system for each of the seven cases.191 Reflecting this,
responses to the two general questions which asked about the hypo-
thetical system showed that people generally thought this system did a
poor job of administering justice. In response to the first question—
whether the system assigned deserved punishments—the average
response, 3.41, was significantly lower than the scale midpoint of 5.192
The same was true for the average on the second question about the
credibility of the system, for which the mean was 3.97.193 Evidently,
having learned about the unjust punishments given by this system,
subjects’ impressions of it were markedly negative.
The data that are critical for the study’s main hypothesis concern
the differences between the pre-stimulation and post-stimulation
responses to the questions that asked about intentions and attitudes
with regard to the criminal justice system. As Table 6 shows, subjects’
attitudes and behavioral intentions post-stimulation shifted noticeably
from what they had been at the pre-stimulation baseline. For seven of
the eight questions, responses moved in the direction of decreased
reliance on, and decreased willingness to comply and cooperate with,
the criminal law. For Question 2, this decrement was only marginally
reliable. Moreover, these shifts occurred with respect to each of the
three areas of interest we investigated: deference to the law in
drawing conclusions about condemnability of conduct relevant to
shaping norms, intention to cooperate with and assist the system, and
intention to comply with it. The eight questions on which these shifts
occurred, and the means for both time points, were as follows (signifi-
cance values are reported for one-tailed, paired-samples t-tests).
191 Paired sample t-tests, all p < .001. Paired sample t-tests are used to determine
whether there are statistically significant differences between the means from two separate
variables, i.e., between the same subjects’ responses to two separate questions. See David
C. Howell, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR PSYCHOLOGY 182 (4th ed. 1997).
192 One-sample t-test, t (58) = -5.02, p < .001.
193 One-sample t-test, t (58) = -3.72, p < .001.
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TABLE 6
STUDY 2A PRE- AND POST-STIMULATION AVERAGES
Baseline Post-stimulation
Question average average Significance
1. Life sentence means offense conduct must be 6.46 5.14 p<.001
heinous
2. Law prohibition means posting false 6.14 5.76 p<.07
comments must be condemnable
3. High sentence for financial maneuver means 5.25 4.63 p<.02
condemnable
4. Report removal of arrowhead 5.93 5.14 p<.01
5. Give found handgun to police 6.66 5.56 p<.001
6. Report dog violation to authorities 5.15 4.59 p<.01
7. Go back and report your mistake to gas 7.05 5.69 p<.001
station
8. Go back and report your mistake to 7.15 5.71 p<.001
restaurant
The size of these shifts was predicted by subjects’ responses to the
first general question about whether the hypothetical system assigned
deserved punishments. For each of the eight items, the degree to
which subjects saw the hypothetical system as assigning unjust punish-
ments correlated with the size of their attitude shift from pre- to post-
stimulation.194 These correlations are important because they show
the link between individuals’ general beliefs about the justness of the
hypothetical criminal justice system and their more specific attitudes
and intentions with regard to that system.
Study 2a shows how knowledge that a criminal justice system pro-
duces systematic injustices can generate negative attitudes toward that
system. It also suggests that those negative attitudes can lead to dimin-
ished intentions to defer to, cooperate with, and comply with the law.
The systematic changes in attitude and intentions that we observed
occurred even with a relatively small sample size (N < 60), suggesting
that the effects may be quite substantial. However, the “within-
subjects” design of Study 2a is open to a possible criticism concerning
demand characteristics—that by asking the same questions twice,
there may have been an implicit suggestion perceived by some sub-
jects that the experimenters expected them to change their responses.
While acknowledging this point, we note that our subjects were partic-
ipating in a web survey, and that they were entirely anonymous,
which, in contrast to a laboratory setting, should diminish the implied
194 Pearson correlation coefficients ranged from r = -.22 to r = -.37, all ps < .05, one-
tailed. The Pearson correlation coefficient indicates the strength and direction of any linear
relationship between two variables; it ranges between -1 and +1, where -1 is a perfect nega-
tive correlation and +1 is a perfect positive correlation.
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pressure to respond in a way that is perceived to be desired by the
researcher. The fact that the “disillusioning cases” moved in both
directions—with some sentences that were too harsh and some too
lenient—also made it less than obvious what change in responses the
experimenters might be expecting. However, to more conclusively
rule out this possibility, we ran Study 2b, which employed similar mea-
sures to those used in Study 2a, but with a “between-subjects” manip-
ulation in which each subject was asked the questions only once.
C. Study 2b Design and Methodology
Two hundred and seven subjects (137 female, 70 male) were
recruited via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk system and were paid
$0.75 for their participation. The design of the study was straightfor-
ward. Subjects were randomly assigned by the survey program
(Qualtrics) to one of two groups. The experimental or “high-
disillusionment” group (N = 108) was presented with the same series
of seven real-world cases that were presented in Study 2a (see
Appendix C), in which the actual sentencing outcome deviates dra-
matically from ordinary intuitions. Subjects read each case in turn and
assigned a sentence that they thought was appropriate, if any. The
actual sentences assigned to these cases were then revealed, alongside
subjects’ own sentences. As in Study 2a, subjects were instructed that
these cases and sentences were all real and had been handed down by
a variety of legal jurisdictions but that they should assume that the
sentences had all been given by a single, hypothetical criminal justice
system. Subjects then responded to the same eight questions that were
asked in Study 2a (see Table 5), which were presented in a new,
random order for each subject.
The control “low-disillusionment” group (N = 99) followed the
same procedure, except that the seven cases being “sentenced” by
subjects were chosen so that the actual sentences given by courts in
the cases accord more closely with ordinary lay intuitions195—that is,
none of the cases engaged the application of one of the modern crime-
control doctrines described in Part I. These cases, along with their
sentences, are shown in Appendix D. The cases for the high-
disillusionment group were presented in the order shown in Appendix
195 The cases were taken from an earlier study. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 88, R
at 1894–98 (presenting twenty-four cases used in study). The sentences reported to subjects
corresponded to the sentences that might commonly be given in the criminal justice
system. In fact, for each case, the sentence described corresponded to the sentence handed
down in a very similar actual case. The sentences also very closely matched the average
sentences given by forty-six University of Pennsylvania undergraduates who participated in
an earlier pilot study. See supra note 108. R
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C; the cases for the control low-disillusionment group were presented
in this order for each subject: 7, 1, 2, 3, 6, 5, 4 (see Appendix D).
Our hypothesis was that exposure to the injustices created by the
criminal justice system, including those created by current crime-
control doctrines, would undermine the system’s moral credibility and
have the same detrimental effects documented in Study 2a. Thus, we
predicted that when reporting how they would think and act in the
hypothetical criminal justice system, the high-disillusionment group
would report a lessened inclination to defer to the criminal law and to
cooperate and comply with it than the low-disillusionment group. The
procedures in the high- and low-disillusionment conditions resembled
each other as closely as possible, therefore allowing us to test for the
specific causal effect of disillusionment.
As in Study 2a, at the conclusion of the survey, subjects
responded to a series of demographic items, as well as the same two
questions that were asked of Study 2a subjects regarding their general
impressions of the hypothetical criminal justice system.
D. Study 2b Results and Discussion
The results of both the low and high disillusionment groups are
reported in Table 7. As a check on the manipulation, and as Appendix
C shows, subjects’ average sentences in the high-disillusionment con-
dition were dramatically different from the actual sentences imposed
by the criminal justice system for each of the seven cases.196 In con-
trast, for the low-disillusionment condition, the degree of discrepancy
between subjects’ sentences and the law’s was much lower (see
Appendix D). Three out of the seven cases produced statistically
significant discrepancies, and these were of much smaller size than
those in the high-disillusionment condition. Subjects’ average
sentences for the “wolf hallucination” case were lower than the law’s
sentence (seven days vs. three months197), whereas their sentences for
the “clock radio” case were on average higher than the law’s (eleven
months, five days vs. five months198), as were their sentences for the
“slap and bruising at record store” case (nineteen months, ten days vs.
twelve months199). However, although they were significant, these dif-
ferences were quite small in terms of sentence duration in comparison
with the discrepancies for the high-disillusionment condition.
Reflecting the differences between the conditions of the two groups,
196 Paired sample t-tests, all ps < .001.
197 t (98) = 12.64, p < .001.
198 t (98) = 2.53, p < .02.
199 t (98) = 2.47, p < .02.
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responses on the two general questions which asked about the hypo-
thetical system showed that subjects in the high-disillusionment condi-
tion thought the system did a much poorer job of administering justice
than did subjects in the low-disillusionment condition. The high-
disillusionment group thought the system did a worse job of assigning
deserved punishments (3.04 vs. 5.85 on the 9-point scale200), and also
thought the system would have less credibility with its citizens (3.44 vs.
5.96201). For both questions, the mean for the high-disillusionment
group was significantly below the scale midpoint of 5, whereas the
mean for the low-disillusionment group was significantly above the
scale midpoint. The manipulation was thus sufficient to produce more
negative attitudes about the hypothetical system among those in the
high-disillusionment group.
Our main question of interest, though, was whether these nega-
tive general attitudes would translate into specific decreases in willing-
ness to defer to this hypothetical criminal justice system. As predicted,
the subjects in the high-disillusionment group showed less deference
to and less willingness to assist or cooperate with the criminal justice
system than did subjects in the low-disillusionment group when
responding to the test questions. Six of the eight questions produced
differences that were statistically significant in the predicted direction
at the p < .05 level (one-tailed, paired-sample t-tests). That is, the
probability of obtaining these data, assuming that the null hypothesis
of no difference between the means is true, was less than .05 for six of
the eight questions.
Table 7 compares these results to the baseline results for the sub-
jects in Study 2a, who responded to the same eight questions at the
start of Study 2a before any disillusionment.202 The mean response
scores for this no-disillusionment group were statistically significantly
different from the high-disillusionment cases in seven of the eight
instances, and the difference was marginally significant for the
200 t (205) = 10.29, p < .001.
201 p < .001.
202 The comparison between the Study 2a baseline means and the Study 2b means is not
ideal because the subjects were not randomly assigned to the studies. However, the two
Mechanical Turk surveys were run only ten days apart, and analyses revealed that there
were very few differences between the groups. The Study 2a subjects were significantly
older than those in Study 2b, but there were no other significant differences across other
demographic variables, including gender, political views, annual income, belief in God, and
highest education completed. Critically, there were no significant differences between the
sentences handed out by the Study 2a subjects and those handed out by the Study 2b high-
disillusionment group, and there was only one significant difference between these two
subgroups on the post-disillusionment questions. We conclude that it is highly unlikely that
a cohort difference compromises the comparison between the Study 2a baseline and the
Study 2b subjects.
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remaining item (Question 2, p < .07). Table 7 suggests that the greater
the disillusionment, the less likely that people are to cooperate with
the criminal justice system and to defer to it as a moral authority that
shapes societal norms and their internalization of those norms.
TABLE 7
STUDY 2A BASELINE AND STUDY 2B RESULTS203
Question Study 2a baseline Study 2b Study 2b
(for full text of questions, see supra No Low High
Table 5) Disillusionment Disillusionment Disillusionment
1. Life sentence means heinous 6.46a 6.59a 5.35b
2. Posting condemnable 6.14a 5.38b 5.59a,b
3. Financial move condemnable 5.25a 5.16a 4.34b
4. Report arrowhead 5.93a 5.65a 4.95b
5. Turn in hand gun 6.66a 5.40b 4.32c
6. Report dogs violation 5.15a 4.75a,b 4.43b
7. Return to gas station 7.05a 6.63a 5.63b
8. Return to restaurant 7.15a 6.47b 5.84c
What conclusion should we draw from these results in relation to
the crime-control costs of doing injustice? They would seem to suggest
that there are clear benefits to be found in doing justice: greater assis-
tance and cooperation with the criminal justice system, upon which
the system critically depends, and greater ability to harness the pow-
erful forces of social influence and the internalization of norms to gain
compliance in borderline cases and to shape norms where needed.
However, it might be argued, given what has been said in Part III
about the distortions and imperfections inherent to public perceptions
of crime and punishment, that instances of injustice and failures of
justice by the system may not be immediately and fully appreciated by
the community. The fog of media errors and inaccuracies may protect
the system’s reputation even when it does not deserve it and, thus,
deviating from desert might not result in a loss of moral credibility
and its consequent detrimental effects.204
203 Where two cells on a row do not share the same letter, their values are statistically
different. That is, if three adjacent cells have the superscripts: “a,” “a,b,” “b,” it means that
the first cell is significantly different from the third cell, but that the second cell is not
significantly different from either the first or third cell.
204 The reverse is also possible: Distorted media coverage may create the impression
that the criminal justice system is deviating from desert when it is not. This is a potential
problem especially when, as is currently the case, the media tend to focus on the absolute
amount of punishment imposed rather than upon the relative amount of punishment
among different cases. That is, when a sentence is reported in isolation, which is the tradi-
tional news coverage approach, it may seem inappropriate, yet an examination of a fuller
collection of cases may suggest that it is indeed just the sentence this offender deserves,
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Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the fog of media reporting
will so completely insulate the system that it can freely do injustice
and fail to do justice without concern that these imperfections will be
revealed and undermine its moral credibility. Indeed, what seems
likely is that, just as crime is news (thereby exaggerating the rate and
nature of crime), so too are injustice and failure of justice news.205
Even if the nature of the news coverage hides some portion of the
deviations from desert, the more frequently and more seriously the
system deviates from desert, the greater the chances that such devia-
tions will come to light.
Worse, even a very few disclosures have the potential to under-
mine the system’s credibility. As discussed previously, what we know
about making and keeping reputations tells us that the system’s inten-
tion regarding doing justice counts enormously.206 While accidental or
unavoidable injustices or failures of justice may be forgiven when the
system seems committed to trying to do justice, if revealed deviations
from desert are intended by the system—when they are planned and
predictable applications of the criminal law’s rules, as with the modern
crime-control doctrines examined in Parts I and II—then even a single
telling case can have detrimental consequences. The system’s only
protection is to indeed try to do justice as best it can, admitting that
there are some limitations on how perfect it can be in practice.207
E. Limitations and Future Research
In the studies reported here we relied on self-report measures of
individuals’ attitudes and of their willingness to take various actions.
How well these sorts of self-report measures predict actual behavior
might be questioned. Considerable research has shown that the extent
given his relative blameworthiness and the spread of the punishment continuum. A useful
part of the agenda for future research may be to understand how to encourage less dis-
torting media reporting. Some of this will come naturally if the system moves formally to
desert as a distributive principle—something likely to promote public discussion and
improve public understanding of the nature of shared intuitions of justice and the central
role of relative blameworthiness. However, special efforts to improve news reporting may
be a good investment for the long-term success of the criminal justice system.
205 Indeed, especially if the system formalizes and publicizes the importance of doing
justice, such as by adopting desert as the system’s distributive principle in the way that the
Model Penal Code drafters have done, deviations from desert will attract more press atten-
tion, not less.
206 See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 100, at 495–96 (discussing R
impact of doing injustice on reputation of criminal justice system).
207 For an analysis of the various doctrines by which the criminal justice system regularly
and intentionally deviates from desert and a critique of the justifications offered in support
of each doctrine of deviation, see generally ROBINSON & CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE,
supra note 23. R
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to which such measures of attitude and intention predict behavior
varies greatly, depending on whether they specifically capture the con-
text and circumstances in which the relevant behaviors will be
enacted.208 It is well established that very general attitudinal measures
are poorer predictors of behavior than more specific measures that
capture individuals’ “behavioral intentions” to act and to do so in cer-
tain ways.209 Accordingly, the self-report measures that we used in the
present studies were quite specific in describing the context and cir-
cumstances in which the behaviors of interest would occur. Because of
this, we suspect that they have some predictive value with regard to
whether people will cooperate with the law (as examined in Questions
4, 5, and 6, supra Table 5). One might of course look to what people
actually do, and this would provide better evidence of lack of coopera-
tion and assistance. For example, one might look at data on the actual
rates of crime reporting, witness cooperation, or jury nullification in
different areas where there are divergent levels of confidence in the
moral authority of the criminal justice system. The United States, for
instance, could be compared with other countries with noticeably less
just criminal justice systems—which may include most of the countries
in the world. Unfortunately, such data are very difficult to find and
expensive to collect.
208 See generally ICEK AZJEN & MARTIN FISHBEIN, UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES &
PREDICTING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1980) (discussing how measures of attitude and intention
can be used to predict behavior, correspondence between measures of attitude and mea-
sures of behavior, and application of measures in six case studies of socially relevant
behavior).
209 Ajzen and Fishbein’s “theory of reasoned action” originated the term “behavioral
intention.” This theory has been critical in shedding light on the conditions under which
attitudes predict behavior. See id. at pt. 1 (outlining theory of reasoned action, including
construct of behavioral intention as way to predict behavior from attitudes). Much
research originating from this theory (and leading up to it) has corroborated the impor-
tance in predicting behavior of asking questions that gauge people’s intentions to perform
the specific behaviors of interest. See generally Icek Ajzen, Attitudes, Traits, and Actions:
Dispositional Prediction of Behavior in Personality and Social Psychology, in 20
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–63 (1987) (providing theoretical
treatment of when and how general dispositions predict specific behaviors); ALICE H.
EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 155–218 (1993) (providing
integrative review of accumulated research on attitudes including their relation to
behavior); MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION, &
BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY & RESEARCH (1975) (presenting conceptual
framework for theory of reasoned action and model of behavior prediction based on argu-
ment that behavioral intention is function of attitude toward specific behavior and subjec-
tive norms);  A.R. Davidson & J.J. Jaccard, Variables that Moderate the Attitude-Behavior
Relation: Results of a Longitudinal Survey, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1364,
1364–76 (1978) (investigating how attitudes predict specific behaviors of having children
and using oral contraceptives, showing that closer correspondence between attitude mea-
sures and behaviors correlates to stronger predictive relation).
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It is not as clear that there is better evidence than this self-report
data when one considers the issue of shaping societal norms and pro-
moting the internalization of norms (Questions 1, 2, and 3). Whether
these influences will exist is a function of the extent to which people
find the criminal law to be a reliable moral authority, which is what is
measured in these three questions.
The third effect of disillusionment—compliance with the criminal
laws’ commands (Questions 7 and 8)—could also be measured more
directly than by relying upon the self-reporting done here. However,
we suspect that there is a limit to what one will find. For much con-
duct, the impropriety is clear, and nothing that the criminal justice
system can do will change that fact. Societal forces, such as deeply
held existing attitudes, can maintain a norm without much help from
the criminal justice system. Other forces can establish the con-
demnability of certain conduct, especially that at or near the core of
wrongdoing, even without the help of the criminal law.210 Even
extreme disillusionment, then, is not likely to undermine social norms
with regard to this type of conduct. We would expect the extent of the
law’s moral credibility to have more of an effect in borderline cases,
where the condemnability of conduct is not as clear.211
The issue of compliance is further complicated because the crim-
inal justice system can potentially affect rates of compliance through
multiple causal routes. As we have argued, the moral credibility of the
system likely exerts some causal effect on compliance. For instance, a
person may remain stopped at a deserted red light purely as a function
of internalized norms, rather than any cost-benefit analysis. And these
norms, as we have previously argued, are shaped by the moral credi-
bility of the criminal justice system. But compliance is also affected by
more local cost-benefit analyses, including, for example, concerns
about a highly arbitrary and punitive criminal justice system. Such a
system can produce a variety of unpredictable and perverse effects.
For example, a system perceived as being arbitrary and highly punitive
may encourage people to avoid acts that potentially entangle them in
the system. This might have negative effects, as in dissuading people
from reporting crime to the police or being a witness in court. Indeed,
210 See Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared
Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007) (arguing that matters on which there is
high agreement across demographics cannot easily be manipulated, whether due to human
predisposition to holding such intuitions or to universal social learning conditions).
211 See Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 1, at 29–31 (arguing that R
criminal justice system will command more deference in borderline cases if perceived to be
morally authoritative); Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 100, at 475–77 R
(discussing how criminal law’s moral authority has effect in cases where ambiguity exists as
to whether conduct is wrong).
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this sort of perverse effect may be what accounts for the shift in sub-
jects’ responses to the gas station and restaurant items in Studies 2a
and 2b: The perceived injustice of the system discourages people from
returning to pay the bill they forgot to pay. However, under the right
circumstances, such a reputation for arbitrariness also might produce
beneficial effects, such as helping to discourage people from commit-
ting crimes. On the other hand, few people would want to live in a
society whose program for avoiding crime is to be particularly arbi-
trary or unjust in its treatment of suspected violators.212
F. Previous Studies
The conclusions reached here are consistent with previous studies
suggesting that conflicts between the criminal law’s dispositional rules
and the community’s shared intuitions of justice have the sorts of det-
rimental effects described above. As discussed below, a number of
studies have confirmed the existence of the relationship between an
individual’s disbelief in the morality of a particular law and his or her
willingness to obey that law. Studies also show that the degree to
which people report that they have obeyed a law in the past and plan
to obey it in the future correlates with the degree to which they judge
that law to be morally valid. Some studies also go further in showing
how perceptions of injustice might lead to more generalized flouting
of the law.
Several studies have focused on how beliefs about the morality of
a particular law can affect compliance with it. In one such study by
Grasmick and Green, a random sample of 400 adults was selected
212 As previously mentioned, a possible criticism of the Study 2a design is that it
introduces a demand to respond in ways that the subject perceives that the researcher
expects. See supra Part IV.B. Study 2a is more vulnerable to this criticism than is Study 2b
because it used a within-subjects design. The lack of face-to-face contact between the
researcher and subject diminishes the concern, although perhaps not entirely. But the
results of Study 2b, which was performed between subjects, cast more doubt on the exis-
tence of any such demand effect. Subjects, of course, perceived a relation between the two
parts of Study 2b, but it is unlikely that this exerted pressure on them to respond in a
particular way. The expected effect was not necessarily obvious to subjects in the disillu-
sionment condition, since the sentences were both overly punitive and overly lenient. We
thus think it unlikely that subjects were able to reliably divine the hypothesis under investi-
gation. Indeed, one potential hypothesis they might have entertained, entirely contrary to
the one that was supported, is that the researchers wanted them to respond in more moral
and law-abiding ways in the high-disillusionment condition, since a reliance on personal
morality comes to the fore when the legal system is doing a poor job. Finally, the manipula-
tion was also produced by allowing whatever differences existed between subjects’
sentences and the law’s to emerge naturally, and it did not rely on any explicit statements
about the quality of the legal system by the researchers; subjects had to draw their own
inferences about this issue. In sum, we conclude that the worry about “experimenter
demand” is insubstantial.
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from the Polk City Directory and subsequently interviewed.213 Infor-
mation was gathered about the subjects’ involvement in eight illegal
activities—theft of property worth less than $20, theft of property
worth more than $20, gambling illegally, cheating on tax returns,
intentionally inflicting personal injury, littering, illegal use of fire-
works, and driving under the influence.214 The respondents were then
asked to estimate the perceived certainty of arrest, the perceived
severity of punishment, and their moral commitment to adhering to
the given legal rule.215 The researchers summarized their results by
saying that “three independent variables—moral commitment, per-
ceived threat of legal punishment and threat of social disapproval—
appear to constitute a concise and probably exhaustive set of factors
which inhibit illegal behavior.”216
Similarly, in another study, Jacob suggests a greater relation
between compliance and a law’s perceived moral correctness than
between compliance and the perceived likelihood of punishment for
violating it. He interviewed 176 people over the age of eighteen from
Evanston, Illinois by allowing a computer to pick random phone num-
bers. The respondents were interviewed regarding whether they sped
on highways, had smoked marijuana, and would shoplift a $50 item if
no one was looking.217 Marijuana smokers were the most numerous,
followed by speeders, followed by potential shoplifters. Two-thirds of
respondents thought the fifty-five mile-an-hour speed limit was right,
three-quarters agreed that the laws against shoplifting were correct,
but only one-quarter thought the law against marijuana was correct.
The results showed that for those who think the speeding laws are
right, 62.3% comply, while only 9.8%, who think it is wrong, comply.
Of those who think the marijuana law is just, 85% do not smoke mari-
juana. Contrastingly, only 36% of those respondents who think that
the law is wrong complied with its ban on smoking. There was no sta-
tistical difference in shoplifting, which is evidence of high agreement
that shoplifting is wrong.218 The researchers conclude that “[t]he rela-
tionship between compliance and legitimacy appears to be consider-
213 Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and
Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 329
(1980) (describing research procedures).
214 Id. at 330 (explaining research procedures).
215 Id.
216 Id. at 334.
217 See Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions, 2 L. & POL’Y
Q. 61, 64–67 (1980) (presenting outcomes of Illinois phone survey comparing effects of
perceived cost of violating law and perceived legitimacy of law on imputed compliance).
218 Id. at 70 (presenting results regarding legitimacy of law and compliance).
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ably stronger than the one between compliance and perceptions of
severity or certainty of sanctions.”219
Matthew Silberman conducted a similar study of 174 undergradu-
ates at a small private university.220 The students responded to
whether they had ever committed certain moral or legal violations,
such as assault, use of hard drugs, petty theft, vandalism, shoplifting,
drunk and disorderly conduct, premarital sex, marijuana use, and
drinking under age. The students then responded to questions
regarding the morality of the act, the certainty of punishment, the
severity of punishment, and peer involvement. One proposed hypoth-
esis that Silberman tested was that “[t]he higher the degree of moral
support for the legal regulation of an offense or offenses, the lower
the probability that the offense or offenses will be committed . . . .”221
After reviewing the data, Silberman concluded that “[w]hen public
sentiment in general disapproves [of] a given offense, it is relatively
unlikely to occur. Similarly, serious criminal activity is less likely to
occur among those who show a high degree of moral commitment,
even though these individuals might commit less serious offenses,”
thus validating his hypothesis.222
The previous studies demonstrate that perceptions of the moral
legitimacy of particular laws can affect compliance with them. Other
studies have gone further in showing how perceptions of the immo-
rality of a particular law, or of some act of the criminal justice system,
can lead to more generalized effects on compliance. Janice Nadler’s
recent series of studies looked at how knowledge of injustices created
by the criminal justice system can affect intentions to comply with the
law.223 In the first study, subjects read mock newspaper stories
describing legislation that was perceived as either highly just or highly
unjust. Subjects in the unjust condition later reported greater inten-
tions to engage in minor acts of law-breaking which were unrelated to
the content of the unjust legislation, such as parking illegally or
making illegal copies of software.224 In a second study, conducted over
219 Id. at 70; see also Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as Social
Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 301
(1977) (stating that “[t]he belief that marijuana use is immoral . . . functions to inhibit
marijuana use,” while “legal threat . . . shows a measurable, but essentially trivial influence
on marijuana use/nonuse”).
220 Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442
(1976).
221 Id. at 457.
222 Id.
223 See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (providing experi-
mental evidence in support of idea that perceived legitimacy of one law influences compli-
ance with other laws).
224 Id. at 1410–15 (discussing results of Experiment 1).
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the Internet, subjects acted as mock jurors and had to render a verdict
in a fictional case in which the evidence pointed to a guilty verdict.225
Prior to this, they were exposed to a mock news story of a (real) crime
in which the protagonist watched his friend abduct and rape a seven-
year old girl in a casino. The story had two versions—one in which the
protagonist was described as being appropriately punished (just ver-
sion), and another in which he was not punished at all (unjust ver-
sion). In the ensuing mock trial scenario, with unrelated content,
subjects who had seen the unjust news story were more likely to
engage in juror nullification by rendering a “Not Guilty” decision.
A similar study by Erich J. Greene presented cases including the
one described in the Nadler study and also examined their effect on
subjects’ attitudes.226 Greene reached similar conclusions to those
arrived at by Nadler. More specifically, subjects who had read cases in
which the legal system behaved in ways counter to their moral intu-
itions rated themselves “more likely to take steps aimed at changing
the law, . . . less likely to cooperate with police, more likely to join a
vigilante or watch group, and less likely to use the law to guide
behavior.”227 He further concluded, “Overall, participants appeared
less likely to give the law the benefit of any doubt after reading cases
where the law was at odds with their intuitions.”228
These studies affirm the conclusion reached by our Studies 2a and
2b. Nadler’s first study is closest to ours and is also her most conclu-
sive. However, whereas Nadler’s study only investigated issues of
compliance, our studies have extended her result by showing effects
not only on compliance, but also on cooperation and moral credi-
bility.229 The unjust primes in Nadler’s studies were also somewhat
fictionalized, whereas the primes in our studies were descriptions of
real cases. Nadler’s studies are thus an important first step that our
studies have extended. The conclusion we draw is that knowledge of
systemic injustice can negatively affect not only compliance, but also
225 Id. at 1416–24 (presenting methodology and findings of Experiment 2).
226 Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Between Legal Codes and Lay Intuitions
on Respect for the Law (June 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University)
(on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University).
227 Id. at iv.
228 Id. at v.
229 Nadler’s second study, on juror nullification, does investigate cooperation, but its
results are not as easily interpreted as those of her first study, nor are they easily assimi-
lated with our own results. The greater proportion of “Not Guilty” verdicts in the unjust
condition were accompanied by diminished ratings of the defendant’s guilt. Nadler, supra
note 223, at 1424–25. This suggests that the unjust prime (the defendant who got off) may R
have produced juror nullification through shifting subjects’ thresholds for criminal culpa-
bility, rather than through affecting their perceptions of the moral credibility of the crim-
inal justice system.
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other relevant variables such as cooperation and moral credibility, and
that these effects can be produced simply through knowledge of sev-
eral current criminal law practices.
A more recent study by Mullen and Nadler shows how the per-
ception of moral illegitimacy in the legal system can increase rates of
deviant behavior.230 During the experimental session, 137 undergrad-
uates read a newspaper article that summarized the legal trial of a
doctor who allegedly provided an unlawful late-term abortion. Sub-
jects were randomly assigned to read either that the defendant was
found ‘Guilty’ or ‘Not Guilty.’ One week prior to this session, subjects
had completed a questionnaire that assessed their attitudes about
abortion, and these attitudes were used to predict the critical depen-
dent variable, which was whether subjects failed to return (i.e., stole)
the pen that was provided to fill out their questionnaire. After sub-
jects completed all the studies, they were instructed to return their
pen and an envelope containing their materials to designated boxes.
The researchers numbered the identical pens with ink that was only
visible under ultraviolet light. Therefore, subjects did not know that
their pen was numbered but the experimenter was able to identify the
pens that were not returned at the end of each experimental session.
The percentage of subjects who did not return the pen was substan-
tially higher for those subjects who had strong pro-choice attitudes
and who were exposed to the guilty verdict—that is, those for whom
the outcome clashed with their moral principles. The researchers
interpreted these results as indicating that exposure to outcomes that
are inconsistent with a person’s strongly held moral beliefs increases
the likelihood of their engaging in deviant behavior.231
Finally, people’s common compliance with tax law raises inter-
esting issues related to these points. Large numbers of American citi-
zens pay their taxes even though the penalty for tax evasion is not
great, the probability of detection is trivial, and the expected sanction,
therefore, is quite small.232 For these reasons, many legal scholars
believe that the threat of official sanction does not explain why such
large numbers of citizens pay taxes.233 A survey by Karyl A. Kinsey
sheds some light on the underlying forces.234 When people reported
230 Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations
on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239 (2008).
231 See id. at 1243–45 (analyzing results of two studies).
232 See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (posing problem of explaining tax compliance).
233 See id. (discussing alternative explanation for tax compliance).
234 Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis
of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 259
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (presenting results of study of effects of enforcement contacts on
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that a friend or coworker, after contact with the IRS, had been made
to pay more taxes than they properly owed, the people thought the tax
laws generally were less fair and were more likely to intend to cheat
on their taxes in the future.235 Nadler, in reviewing the study, com-
ments that “[t]he results of the tax study suggest that exposure to
reports of an unjust legal outcome in a particular situation might lead
to lower perceived fairness of the law more generally, which in turn
can lead to noncompliance with the law in the future.”236 It would
appear that one who sees tax law and the IRS as being just is likely to
comply even though expected sanctions are small and unlikely.
Taken together, these studies complement our own in suggesting
that knowledge of systematic injustice produced by the criminal jus-
tice system, particularly when it is intentional, can have a range of
deleterious effects on people’s attitudes and behavior. People are less
likely to comply with laws they perceive to be unjust. They may also
be less likely to comply with the law in general when they perceive the
criminal justice system to cause injustice. Our studies have shown that
these sorts of effects are not limited to compliance, but generalize to
cooperation and assistance with the legal system, as well as to percep-
tions of its moral authority, which can affect its ability to harness the
normative forces of social influence and the internalization of norms.
The flip side, of course, is that if the criminal justice system reflects
ordinary perceptions of justice, it can take advantage of a range of
psychological mechanisms that serve to increase assistance, coopera-
tion, compliance, and deference.
V
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF LAW’S MORAL
CREDIBILITY: STUDY 3
The studies reported in Part IV suggest that doing injustice and
failing to do justice can undermine the criminal justice system’s moral
credibility, which in turn can lead to citizen reluctance to support,
assist, and defer to the system. Those studies were conducted using
data collected by the present researchers under controlled conditions.
One may wonder whether the same effects might be observed in data
from large population samples collected by others.
In this study, we worked with existing national databases to see
what, if anything, they might tell us about our hypothesis concerning
sanctions perceptions, perceived fairness of tax laws, and intentions of future compliance
with tax laws).
235 Id. at 276, 282 (discussing effects of vicarious enforcement contacts on intention to
comply in future).
236 Nadler, supra note 223, at 1409–10. R
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the practical impacts of a system’s moral credibility on the effective
operation of the criminal justice system. One large national survey
involving telephone interviews with Americans presents potentially
relevant variables. The database includes people who recently partici-
pated in criminal court proceedings. Bivariate and multivariate statis-
tical techniques were used to determine whether the observed results
support our research hypothesis: As the moral credibility of the crim-
inal justice system increases, the willingness to defer to the courts to
resolve a similar case in the future will also increase. The findings
presented below suggest that the dynamics from the experiment
reported in Studies 2a and 2b also operate among people who have
actual experience with the criminal courts. Put simply, if a person has
a high level of confidence in the moral credibility of the criminal jus-
tice system, he or she will be more likely to defer to the system in the
future.
A. Study 3 Dataset
The study used data from the Survey of Public Opinion on the
Courts in the United States, conducted in 2000.237 That dataset, which
is available from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data at the
University of Michigan, consists of 1567 telephone interviews of ran-
domly selected adults in the United States.238 Interviews were con-
ducted by the Indiana University Public Opinion Laboratory
(IUPOL) between March 22, 2000 and May 3, 2000.239 The survey
237 DAVID B. ROTTMAN, RANDALL HANSEN, NICOLE MOTT & LYNN GRIMES, INTER-
UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, PUBLIC OPINION ON
THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2000 (2000), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
ICPSR/studies/3864?archive=ICPSR& q=public+opinion+on+the+courts+ [hereinafter
ROTTMAN DATASET] (search “All Fields” for “ICPSR03864”).
238 Sample characteristics: Gender: Male, 44%, female, 56%; Race/Ethnicity: White, not
Hispanic, 52%, African American, 26%, Hispanic, 20%, other minority, 2%; Age: Average
= 43 years; Education: Less than high school, 9%, high school graduate, 29%, some college,
35%, college graduate, 27%; Household Income: $20,000 or less, 26%, $20,001 to $40,000,
30%, $40,001 to $80,000, 30%, $80,000 or more, 14%; Marital Status: Married, 50%, living
together but not married, 5%, single, never married, 22%, separated, divorced, or wid-
owed, 23%. See ROTTMAN ET AL., Codebook and Data Collection Instrument, in ROTTMAN
DATASET, supra note 237, at 1, 31–32 (describing sample characteristics). R
239 The sampling strategy adopted by IUPOL corrected for the common problem of
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in telephone surveys by oversampling
African Americans and Hispanics. The survey was administered in English and Spanish.
Additionally, the IUPOL took a number of steps to ensure data quality. First, interviewers
received at least four hours of training. Most of the interviewers had prior experience con-
ducting telephone surveys. Second, a widely accepted telephone survey sampling tech-
nique, random-digit-dialing with quotas, was used to contact potential respondents. Finally,
selected telephone numbers were called repeatedly until an interview was successfully
completed. Telephone numbers were replaced if the individual who was contacted by the
research staff refused to participate on three separate occasions, if the number was discon-
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instrument consisted of two sets of questions. The first set, adminis-
tered to all respondents, asked subjects their perceptions of the courts
in general, while the second set, which was administered only to
respondents who reported recent experience with the courts, queried
respondents specifically about their recent court involvement (e.g., the
type of case and their role in it).240
The present study focused on a subset of respondents within the
larger data file who reported recent significant interaction with the
criminal justice system. Specifically, we selected survey respondents
who met all of the following criteria: (1) either the respondent or a
member of his or her household had involvement in the courts in the
last twelve months; (2) the case was a criminal matter (including juve-
nile offenses); and (3) in the case, the subject or household member
was either a juror or a witness, but not a defendant, and thus less
likely to have a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Of the 1567
subjects, 146 individuals met these criteria. Of that 146, 141 were suit-
able for use in the present study.241
The subsample consists of nearly equal numbers of men and
women. A majority of subjects were white, but racial and ethnic
minorities were well represented in the data file. The respondents’
ages ranged from eighteen to more than seventy-two years. An over-
whelming majority of subjects graduated from high school, and more
than one-third had earned a four-year college degree. When asked
about their combined household incomes (before taxes), a majority of
subjects reported an income exceeding $40,000. As for marital status,
over half of respondents were married. Finally, over two-thirds of the
subjects who reported experience in recent criminal court cases
nected or no longer in service, or if the potential subject was not contacted after twenty
attempts. See ROTTMAN ET AL., Description, in ROTTMAN DATASET, supra note 237, at iv R
(describing survey methodology).
240 See ROTTMAN ET AL., Codebook and Data Collection Instrument, in ROTTMAN
DATASET, supra note 237, at app. A (“Data Collection Instrument”) (reproducing ques- R
tions asked of subjects).
241 A common problem with using telephone survey data is that some respondents do
not answer every question. Missing cases were replaced using Similar Response Pattern
Imputation (SRPI). SRPI is a technique that is widely used to impute missing cases. Using
a series of matching variables, SRPI searches the data file of interest for “donor cases.”
Once a similar response pattern is found, the donor’s score is used in place of the missing
value. When compared to other methods for handling missing cases (e.g., mean imputation
and listwise deletion), research shows that SRPI is a superior technique. See Gerhard
Gmel, Imputation of Missing Values in the Case of a Multiple Item Instrument Measuring
Alcohol Consumption, 20 STAT. MED. 2369, 2379 (2001) (showing that SRPI, or “hot-deck
imputation,” is superior relative to other available procedures).
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(either personal or vicarious through a household member) served as
jurors.242
B. Study 3 Variables
Three survey items were used to develop the key predictor (or
independent) variable. Interviewers asked respondents “[P]lease tell
me how well you think the courts in your community handle each of
the following kinds of cases.”243 Subjects were then asked to judge
their local courts’ handling of cases involving violence, substance
abuse, and delinquency on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being
“the very lowest” and 5 being “the very highest.”244 These scores
reflect respondents’ judgments about the extent to which local crim-
inal court outcomes, such as whether individuals who deserve it are
punished and whether the deserved amounts of punishment are
imposed, are consistent with their own ideals. The average responses
suggest that the subjects with court experience view the outcomes of
criminal cases as most consistent with their intuitions of justice in
cases involving violence (3.40), and comparatively less so for cases
involving drug abusers or drunk drivers (2.96) and juvenile delin-
quency (2.74).
Each subject’s three answers to the survey items were summed to
create the single scale that was used as the predictor variable, which
we term “moral credibility.” The scale thus ranged from 3 (low moral
credibility) to 15 (high moral credibility), with the average subject’s
score at 9.09. A series of statistical tests confirmed that the moral
credibility scale is a valid and reliable measure.245
242 Subsample characteristics: Gender: Male, 49%, female, 51%; Race/Ethnicity: White,
not Hispanic, 56%, African American, 24%, Hispanic, 17%, other minority, 3%; Age:
Average = 41 years; Education: Less than high school, 5%, high school graduate, 22%,
some college, 37%, college graduate, 36%; Household Income: $20,000 or less, 17%,
$20,001 to $40,000, 24%, $40,001 to $80,000, 41%, $80,000 or more, 18%; Marital Status:
Married, 56%, living together but not married, 4%, single, never married, 19%, separated,
divorced, or widowed, 21%; Role in criminal court case: Juror, 69%, witness, 31%. When
compared to the full sample of survey respondents, the subsample consists of slightly more
females, individuals who have received higher levels of formal education, and those with
higher household incomes. In terms of race/ethnicity, age, and marital status, the two sam-
ples are very similar.
243 ROTTMAN ET AL., Codebook and Data Collection Instrument, in ROTTMAN
DATASET, supra note 237, at app. A, 1 (“Data Collection Instrument”). R
244 See id. 
245 Various statistical techniques are used by behavioral and social scientists to evaluate
the psychometric properties of multi-item summated scales. To assess the validity of the
moral credibility scale, the three survey items are entered into an exploratory factor anal-
ysis. This technique is used to determine whether the three survey items tap into the same
underlying construct. The factor structure that emerges indicates that the scale is uni-
dimensional (eigenvalue = 2.07; factor loadings > .80). For technical details on factor-
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The outcome variable in the study was “willingness to defer to
the criminal justice system in the future.” There are a number of ways
in which this measure is related to real-world behaviors of any partic-
ular member of society. High willingness to defer to the system might
mean that a person is less likely to take self-help measures, engage in
vigilantism, or flee from police, and is more likely to report violations
by others rather than ignore them, more likely to turn himself or her-
self in after an accident, and so on.
A single survey item was used to construct the outcome variable.
Survey respondents with criminal court experience were asked, “How
likely would you be to go to the courts to resolve a similar dispute you
became involved in at some point in the future?”246 Respondents were
asked to select from four responses on a scale ranging from “very
unlikely” (coded as 1) to “very likely” (coded as 4). The distribution
of responses was: 24.3% “very unlikely,” 15.3% “unlikely,” 22.2%
“likely,” and 38.2% “very likely.” The average score on the 4-point
scale was 2.73.
C. Study 3 Results and Discussion
Following standard practices in the social sciences, we first con-
ducted a relatively lenient test of the research hypothesis where the
relationship between moral credibility and willingness to defer to the
criminal justice system in the future was analyzed without considera-
tion of potential intervening variables, such as the respondent’s race,
gender, age, or socio-economic status. This test established whether
some relationship exists between the two key variables. To evaluate
the relationship between moral credibility and willingness to defer to
the system, we employed Pearson’s r.247 The Pearson’s r coefficient
analytic techniques, see generally MARJORIE A. PETT, NANCY R. LACKEY & JOHN L.
SULLIVAN, MAKING SENSE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (2003) and BRUCE THOMPSON,
EXPLORATORY AND CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS (2004). To assess the scale relia-
bility, two common measures of internal consistency are used. The results of these proce-
dures confirm that the scale possesses a high level of reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .78;
mean inter-item correlation = .54). For a discussion of coefficient alpha and reliability
theory, see generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of
Theory and Applications, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 98 (1993). In sum, the evidence indi-
cates that the moral credibility scale has strong psychometric properties.
246 ROTTMAN ET AL., Codebook and Data Collection Instrument, in ROTTMAN
DATASET, supra note 237, at app. A, 8 (“Data Collection Instrument”). R
247 The linear statistical techniques used in this section are sensitive to the distributional
characteristics of the variables included in the analysis. When variable scores resemble a
normal distribution (or a bell-shaped curve), we gain confidence that our estimates are
unbiased. Statistical tests show that the score distributions for the moral credibility and
willingness to defer variables are symmetric (or bell-shaped). Thus, the results from the
linear statistical models will not be adversely affected by displeasing variable attributes.
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ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. The closer the estimate is to an absolute
value of 1 (that is, either -1.0 or +1.0), the stronger the relationship.
The correlation between these two key variables we examined is +.283
(significance level = .001).248
In other words, when the law’s moral credibility is high, people
express a greater willingness to defer to the system in the future. This
is an important finding because it demonstrates in an existing
database the real-world benefits of moral credibility—if those who
believe more strongly in the moral credibility of the system are more
willing to defer to its authority, the incidence of negative activities
such as the use of self-help or fleeing from law enforcement should
decrease as moral credibility increases.
We then tested the research hypothesis using multivariate anal-
ysis. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression was used, which allowed
us to rule out concerns that the observed relationship between moral
credibility and willingness to defer to the criminal justice system could
be explained by potential intervening variables, such as the respon-
dent’s race, gender, age, and socio-economic status, thus providing a
more stringent test of the effect of moral credibility when compared to
Pearson’s r. Table 8 presents an OLS model where the outcome mea-
sure—willingness to defer to the criminal justice system—is regressed
onto moral credibility and onto standard subject characteristics that
might also have influence.249 The standardized regression coefficients
248 The study used two-tailed tests of statistical significance. The two-tailed test, also
known as a nondirectional test, does not require that the direction of the research hypoth-
esis (i.e., positive or negative) be specified. The one-tailed test is a directional test, com-
monly used when the research hypothesis is directional in nature. Both tests are
appropriate in a variety of situations; however, the two-tailed test requires that a higher
threshold be met to achieve statistical significance.
249 The respondent characteristic variables were coded as follows: gender (1 = male
respondent, 0 = female respondent), age (in years), race (1 = white, non-Hispanic respon-
dent, 0 = racial and/or ethnic minority respondent), education (1 = less than fifth grade to 9
= graduate or professional degree), household income (1 = less than $10,000 to 10 = more
than $120,000), and marital status (1 = married respondent, 0 = otherwise). According to
established guidelines, the sample is sufficiently large to estimate a six-variable OLS model
to detect medium effect sizes. See Samuel B. Green, How Many Subjects Does It Take To
Do a Regression Analysis?, 26 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 499, 503 (1991) (showing that
power-based analyses suggest that seven-variable regression model consists of minimum of
102 cases to show medium effect sizes). Finally, we evaluated the intercorrelations between
the independent variables. When correlations are high, say above .80, harmful levels of
collinearity may result in biased parameter estimates. See Mark H. Licht, Multiple
Regression and Correlation , in READING AND UNDERSTANDING MULTIVARIATE
STATISTICS 45 (Laurence G. Grimm & Paul R. Yarnold eds., 1995) (stating that correla-
tions between independent variables in excess of .80 should be considered “very problem-
atic”). Our investigation revealed that none of the bivariate correlations between the
independent variables exceeded an absolute value of .41. Results from the model diag-
nostic tests strongly suggested that collinearity was not a threat. For example, the estimates
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Willingness to Defer to the Criminal Justice
Variable System in the Future
Standardized Regression Coefficient Significance Level





Household Income .017 .859
Married .167 .069
As can be seen in Table 8, the effect of moral credibility is posi-
tive and statistically significant, indicating that higher levels of moral
credibility correspond to a greater willingness to defer to the criminal
justice system. The effect of moral credibility is stronger than any of
the other variables in the model, which means that it is more impor-
tant in predicting deference to the criminal justice system than those
other variables.250 Indeed, it is the only one of the variables that is
statistically significant.251 The importance of this finding is under-
from the tolerance tests exceed .70, which is considered a conservative threshold in the
social and behavioral sciences.
250 The formal statistical interpretation of the moral credibility effect is as follows: Each
standard deviation increase in the moral credibility scale corresponds to a .265 standard
deviation increase in the willingness to defer to the criminal justice system in the future.
251 A number of model statistics can be used to evaluate the fit of an OLS regression
equation. The measure of joint correlation (or F-test) for the model presented in Table 8
indicates that the group of independent variables reliably predicts willingness to defer to
the criminal justice system in the future (F = 2.91, significance level = .01). The coefficient
of multiple determination (or R2) shows that the model explains 13% of the variation
about the dependent variable, willingness to defer. We explored whether other variables
outside the scope of the theory being tested here also influence whether experienced
respondents are willing to assist legal authorities during the criminal court process. Prior
research has shown that citizens who perceive police processes as procedurally just report a
greater willingness to participate in crime prevention programs. See Michael D. Reisig,
Procedural Justice and Community Policing—What Shapes Residents’ Willingness To
Participate in Crime Prevention Programs, 1 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 356, 364 (2007)
(discussing results of survey showing that people who believe police exercise authority
fairly are more willing to participate in crime preventon). Based on prior research, we
reason that perceptions of procedural justice regarding court processes may also influence
willingness to serve as a juror or witness in a criminal court case. When entered into the
equation featured in Table 8, the procedural justice scale (a 7-item summated scale,
Cronbach’s alpha = .889) was a significant predictor (standardized regression coefficient =
.303, significance level = .003).
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scored by the fact that effective operation of the criminal justice
system depends upon such deference from citizens.
To summarize, the study attempted to assess whether there are
real-world crime-control benefits to administering justice in a manner
that is consistent with the intuitions of justice of the community. After
an analysis using both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques,
the results showed that respondents with criminal court experience
who viewed their community courts as morally credible in dealing
with criminal cases (specifically those involving violence, drugs/
alcohol, and delinquency) expressed a greater willingness to defer to
the criminal justice system in the future.252 The results from the study
empirically challenge the conventional wisdom that deviations from
desert are essentially cost-free. Individuals who perceived failures of
the criminal justice system were significantly less likely to say they
would defer to the system in the future.253
D. Limitations and Future Research
Before discussing avenues for future research on the effects of
moral credibility, we should note a limitation of the research strategy
employed in Study 3. Like many social scientific studies that test
directional research hypotheses, Study 3 used cross-sectional survey
data from a general population sample. As previously noted, the
responses provided by each participant were collected during indi-
vidual telephone interviews. Cross-sectional data of this type only
252 A potential limitation of the study concerns the use of a non-random subsample to
estimate a behavioral outcome. Statistical problems arise when membership in the sub-
sample is not independent from the outcome measure. When this is the case, selection bias
becomes a threat. The most frequently employed approach for dealing with sample selec-
tion bias is Heckman’s two-step correction. See Richard A. Berk, An Introduction to
Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 386, 393–96 (1983) (pro-
viding empirical application of Heckman’s two-step correction using citizen survey data);
James J. Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153,
156–60 (1979) (providing formal demonstration of how two-step Heckman estimator can
correct for sample selection bias). This two-step modeling process has several require-
ments, one of which is the inclusion of exclusion restrictions in the first-stage model (i.e.,
variables that predict the selection outcome in the first-stage model but are not related to
the dependent variable in the second-stage model). Unfortunately, we were unable to con-
struct a first-stage model that included exclusion restrictions that predicted membership in
the subsample (i.e., recent personal or vicarious experience as a juror or witness). Accord-
ingly, the extent to which sample selection bias was a problem in this study remains
unknown.
253 We assessed whether the correlation between moral credibility and willingness to
defer to the criminal justice system differed between the two groups that make up our
subsample—jurors and witnesses. We found that the estimates for jurors and witnesses
were nearly identical. Grouping jurors and witnesses into a single subsample increases
statistical power. Given the consistent bivariate relationship between the two key variables
across these two groups, this approach is empirically justifiable.
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allow us to make claims about relationships between key theoretical
variables (i.e., moral credibility and willingness to defer) that are cor-
relational in nature. Although the observed effect of moral credibility
in Table 8 is consistent with our hypothesis, we cannot claim that the
analysis presented above demonstrates a causal link between moral
credibility and willingness to defer to the criminal justice system in the
future. When considered alongside the results from the controlled
experiments from Studies 2a and 2b, however, the weight of the evi-
dence suggests that moral credibility is a salient causal mechanism in
determining behaviors among members of the general public that help
the criminal justice system function.
We encourage future researchers to investigate whether moral
credibility predicts differences in the kinds of measures noted in the
introduction to Part IV: the stigmatization effect of criminal appre-
hension and conviction, vigilantism, the willingness of citizens to assist
or at least acquiesce in the system’s judgments and directions, to inter-
nalize the system’s pronouncements about what conduct is truly con-
demnable, and to defer to its commands in situations of
criminalization grey areas.254 Studies such as these will help determine
the explanatory and predictive scope of moral credibility.
Research also needs to be conducted in other countries with
criminal justice systems of noticeably different levels of moral credi-
bility than that of the United States. Doing so would help determine
whether the findings reported here can be replicated in settings
outside the United States. Unfortunately, the general databases that
currently exist, nationally and internationally, offer little opportunity
for such testing. Ideally, research could examine a measure of moral
credibility drawn from different societies with noticeably different
levels of moral credibility in their criminal justice systems. One could
then compare these two groups as to the predicted resulting attitudes
and behaviors of cooperation with and deference to the system. If a
254 Several recent studies have used legal compliance with soft crimes and cooperation
with police scales and may prove useful in future studies on the effects of moral credibility.
See Michael D. Reisig, Jason Bratton & Marc G. Gertz, The Construct Validity and
Refinement of Process-Based Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1014
(2007) (using compliance scale consisting of six minor offenses: “made a lot of noise at
night,” “bought something you thought might be stolen,” “drank alcohol in a place you are
not suppose [sic] to,” “smoked marijuana,” “illegally disposed of trash and litter,” and
“broke traffic laws”); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 513, 541 (2003)
(using compliance scale items that asked respondents whether they followed rules about
seven types of behavior: “where to park a car legally,” “how to legally dispose of trash and
litter,” “not making noise at night,” “not speeding or breaking traffic laws,” “not buying
possible stolen items on the street,” “not taking inexpensive items from stores or restau-
rants without paying,” and “not using drugs such as marijuana”).
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system’s moral credibility is higher, do we see higher levels of citizens
reporting crimes to police, agreeing to serve as witnesses, internalizing
the law’s condemnation of newly criminalized conduct, following the
legal instructions given to jurors, and a variety of other effects dis-
cussed in Part II?
CONCLUSION
At the start of this Article, we described the concerns of two
quite different groups, traditionally opposed to one another, who had
found common ground in their opposition to the recent shift toward
desert as the primary distributive principle for criminal liability and
punishment.255 The first group—those concerned with what they see
as the over-punitiveness of current criminal law—worries that setting
desert as the dominant distributive principle means continuing the
punitive doctrines that they find so objectionable, and perhaps even
making things worse. The second group—those concerned with
ensuring effective crime control—worries that a desert distributive
principle will create many missed crime-control opportunities and will
increase avoidable crime. The evidence we present should give some
comfort to both groups that a shift toward desert will not undermine
these goals.
The first group’s concern about punitiveness rests upon a false
assumption that the current punitive crime-control doctrines of which
they disapprove are a product of and a manifestation of the commu-
nity’s intuitions of justice. As is clear from Study 1 reported in Part II,
however, the reverse is true. The current crime-control doctrines seri-
ously conflict with people’s intuitions of justice by exaggerating the
punishment deserved. Thus, a distribution of liability and punishment
that tracks lay intuitions of justice would significantly reduce the injus-
tice now present. As Part III explains, the modern crime-control doc-
trines are not a product of the community’s sense of justice, but rather
of the distortions inherent to American crime politics.
We also provide a persuasive response to the concerns of the
second group: that a desert distributive principle will create many
missed crime-control opportunities and will increase avoidable crime.
Studies 2 and 3 reported in Parts IV and V help refute the common
wisdom of the past half-century that it is cost-free for the system to
deviate from desert in the pursuit of crime control through deterrence,
incapacitation of the dangerous, and other such coercive crime-control
programs. There are crime-control costs in deviating from desert that
follow from the system’s reduced moral credibility within the commu-
255 See supra Section B of Introduction.
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nity it governs. Those crime-control costs must be taken into account
in setting an effective crime-control program. The power of the forces
of normative social influence and internalization of norms, and rea-
sons to be increasingly skeptical about the crime-control effectiveness
of the traditional mechanisms of coercive crime control,256 suggest
that, in the long run, doing justice may be the most effective means of
fighting crime.
In conclusion, we believe that the studies reported here will give
assurances to both groups concerned about a shift to desert as the
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment. The shift
to a desert distribution—specifically empirical desert—will not seri-
ously undermine the criminal justice system’s crime-control effective-
ness—and indeed may enhance it—and is not likely to increase the
system’s punitiveness—and instead is more likely to reduce it—in
order to better track the community’s shared intuitions of justice.
256 See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 21 (discussing reason to R
be skeptical of crime control effectiveness of measures that deviate from desert).
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APPENDIX A
TEXT OF STUDY 1’S “MILESTONE” SCENARIOS
1. UMBRELLA MISTAKE – John takes another person’s umbrella
assuming it to be his own because it is has the same unusual color
pattern as his own, a fact that the police confirm.
2. WOLF HALLUCINATION – Another person slips a drug into
John’s food, which causes him to hallucinate that he is being attacked
by a wolf. When John strikes out in defense, he does not realize that
he is in fact striking a person, a fact confirmed by all of the psychia-
trists appointed by the state, who confirm John could not prevent the
hallucination.
3. WHOLE PIES FROM BUFFET – The owner has posted rules at
his all-you-can-eat buffet that expressly prohibit taking food away;
patrons can only take what they eat at the buffet. The owner has set
the price of the buffet accordingly. John purchases dinner at the
buffet, but when he leaves he takes with him two whole pies to give to
a friend.
4. CLOCK RADIO FROM CAR – As he is walking to a party in a
friend’s neighborhood, John sees a clock radio on the backseat of a car
parked on the street. Later that night, on his return from the party, he
checks the car and finds it unlocked, so he takes the clock radio from
the backseat.
5. MICROWAVE FROM HOUSE – While a family is on vacation,
John jimmies the back door to their house and steps into their kitchen.
On the counter, he sees their microwave, which he carries away.
6. SLAP AND BRUISING AT RECORD STORE – A record store
patron is wearing a cap that mocks John’s favorite band. John follows
him from the store, confronts him, then slaps him in the face hard,
causing him to stumble. The man’s face develops a harsh black and
yellow bruise that does not go away for some time.
7. STITCHES AFTER SOCCER GAME – Angry after overhearing
another parent’s remarks during a soccer match in which John’s son is
playing, John approaches the man after the game, grabs his coffee
mug, knocks him down, then kicks him several times while he is on the
ground, knocking him out for several minutes and causing cuts that
require five stitches.
8. ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AT GAS STATION – John demands
money from a man buying gas at a gas station. When the man refuses,
John punches the man several times in the face, breaking his jaw and
causing several cuts that each require stitches. He then runs off
without getting any money.
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9. CLUBBING DURING ROBBERY – To force a man to give up his
wallet during a robbery attempt, John beats the man with a club until
he relinquishes his wallet, which contains $350. The man must be hos-
pitalized for two days.
10. MAULING BY PIT BULLS – Two vicious pit bulls that John
keeps for illegal dog fighting have just learned to escape and have
attacked a person who came to John’s house. The police tell John he
must destroy the dogs, which he agrees to do but does not intend to
do. The next day, the dogs escape again and maul to death a man
delivering a package.
11. STABBING – John is offended by a woman’s mocking remark
and decides to hurt her badly. At work the next day, when no one else
is around, he picks up a letter opener from his desk and stabs her. She
later dies from the wound.
12. AMBUSH SHOOTING – John knows the address of a woman
who has highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he
waits there for the woman to return from work and, when she
appears, John shoots her to death.
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APPENDIX B
TEXT OF STUDY 1’S “CRIME-CONTROL” SCENARIOS
A. INCORRECT LOBSTER CONTAINER – John and two other sea-
food importers import lobster from Honduras shipped in plastic con-
tainers. Honduran law (but not U.S. law) requires that the containers
be cardboard. John is convicted of a U.S. federal law that criminalizes
the importation of fish or wildlife in violation of foreign law.
B. SHOOTING OF TV – When he was younger, John committed a
number of offenses: twice convicted for burglarizing an unoccupied
building, once convicted of throwing a rock at a car, and once con-
victed of stealing electricity. Several decades later, John, now 59, is
annoyed by the constant arguing between his two sons about what to
watch on television. On this day, he stops the argument by picking up
the .22-caliber revolver that his oldest son left on a nearby table and
shooting the television.
C. MARIJUANA UNLOADING – John frequently helps move furni-
ture for hourly pay for the man from whom he rents a room. On this
occasion, as he is unloading boxes at the house where he lives, he
discovers that some contain marijuana. He nonetheless helps with the
unloading but insists that the boxes with marijuana be stored other
than in the house in which he lives. Some time later, authorities seize
47 of the boxes that contained 1169 kilograms of marijuana.
D. UNDERAGE SEX BY MENTALLY RETARDED MAN – John is a
20-year-old mentally retarded man with an IQ of 52. He is introduced
to Jane, who says she is 16, a fact confirmed by her friends. They have
several long telephone conversations. On this evening, John is
stranded without a ride home and notices Jane’s house nearby. From
her bedroom window she sees him coming and directs him to use a
nearby ladder. They talk for several hours, then have consensual inter-
course. John leaves about 4:30 a.m. 8 1/2 months later, Erica gives
birth and her parents contact the police. She was only 13 at the time of
the intercourse.
E. SEX WITH FEMALE REASONABLY BELIEVED OVERAGE –
John, 19 years old, lets a runaway stay in his apartment. She tells him
she is 18. He reasonably believes that she is over the legal age of 16
and has consensual intercourse with her several times. He is later
arrested because she in fact is 14 years old.
F. AIR CONDITIONER FRAUD – John promises to fix the air con-
ditioner in a local bar where he is having a drink. The bar owner gives
him $129 for parts, which he takes, but he has no intention of
returning to do the job. He has been previously convicted of commit-
ting such frauds more than a half dozen times.
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G. COCAINE IN TRUNK - John runs through a red light in the
early morning and is pulled over by police. After arresting John for
possession of a small amount of marijuana, the police search his car
and find a small package of cocaine in the trunk, two-thirds of a kilo,
about the size of a soda can and a half. John has no prior criminal
record.
H. COCAINE OVERDOSE – John is asked to bring cocaine to a
“drug party.” Three of the people at the party and John shoot up with
the cocaine. One of them uses too much and overdoses and dies. John
is arrested for his homicide.
I. KILLING OFFICER BELIEVED TO BE ALIEN – John suffers from
paranoid schizophrenia of a subtype characterized by delusions and
hallucinations. He believes alien life forms, usually disguised as gov-
ernment agents, are trying to kill him. He keeps a bird in his car to
warn of airborne poison. He sets fishing line with beads and wind
chimes throughout his house as an alarm system against alien inva-
sion. On this occasion, he circles his neighborhood block blaring loud
music in an attempt to keep the aliens away. A policeman comes in
response to complaints about the excessive noise. Believing the officer
to be an alien who has come to kill him, John shoots and kills the
officer.
J. ACCOMPLICE KILLING DURING BURGLARY – John agrees to
help another man burglarize a house while the owner is away. Neither
man is armed. When the owner returns unexpectedly, John is sur-
prised when the other man shoots and kills the owner with a gun the
man apparently found in a nightstand.
K. DROWNING CHILDREN TO SAVE THEM FROM HELL – Jane
and her husband are very religious. With their five young children,
they live in a trailer. Jane is mentally ill and has several times
attempted suicide, mutilated herself, failed to feed her children, and
believes there are cameras in the ceilings. She comes to believe that
because she is a bad mother, her children are doomed to eternal tor-
ment in hell. In order to save them from this state, she drowns them
all in the bathtub.
L. ACCIDENTAL TEACHER SHOOTING – John, 13 years old, is
upset about being suspended from school for ten days just before
summer vacation for throwing water balloons. He returns to the
middle school to say good-bye to friends. When told by a seventh
grade teacher, with whom he has a good relationship, that he must
leave, he pulls out a pistol and points it at the teacher. The gun dis-
charges, hitting the teacher and killing him.
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APPENDIX C





Summary Description subjects in Punishment
(The studies used more detailed Studies 2a and imposed by
Title descriptions.) 2b, respectively court
Case 1. John, a disabled guard at a fed- 2 months; 3 years
Possession of eral prison, is prosecuted under a 2 months
Weapon By Fed- state weapon possession statute
eral Prison that exempts any “guard of any
Guard state prison or of any penal cor-
rectional institution.” John thinks
he qualifies.
Case 2. Two women at a convenience 3.8 years; No liability—
Convenience store argue. One stabs the other. 2.9 years legal rules do
Store Murder After the attacker flees, the not permit lia-
Inaction victim is bleeding profusely but bility for such
unable to stand up and get help. inaction
John steps over her and takes a
photograph of her with his cell
phone but does not call for an
ambulance. If he had anony-
mously called 911, the victim
would not have died.
Case 3. 19-year-old John lets two run- 1.3 years; 50 years
Sex With aways stay at his apartment. The 2.3 years
Female Reason- girls tell him they are 18 years
ably Believed To old and he reasonably believes
Be Age of Con- them because they look at least
sent 18. Each have consensual inter-
course with him. He is convicted
of two counts of sexual assault of
a child because the girls in fact
are under 16.
Case 4. John imports seafood from Hon- 3.5 months; 8 years
Seafood Import duras. While the law of his state 6 months
does not require it and while
John does not know it, Honduran
law requires that cardboard
rather than plastic containers be
used for the shipment (in order
to help the country’s lumber
industry). John is convicted of
violating a law in his state that
criminalizes the importation of
wildlife in violation of a foreign
law.
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Case 5. 30 years ago, John was convicted 9 months; 15 years impris-
Shooting of TV of burglarizing an unoccupied 11 months onment without
building and, 5 years later, of possibility of
throwing a rock at an automobile parole
driven by his father-in-law. Now
age 59, John is frustrated by the
constant arguing between his two
adult sons, who still live at home,
over what television program to
watch. Using a gun his oldest son
left on the table, he shoots out
the television set.
Case 6. Jane is followed into her apart- 33.9 years; No liability—
Upper East Side ment building by John who forces 32.7 years defendant was
Rapist his way into her apartment and, son of a dip-
threatening her with a knife, lomat
anally rapes her. John does the
same thing to ten other women
in the area. Jane one day sees
John on the street and notifies
police, who arrest him.
Case 7. Many years ago, the 21-year-old 4.4 years; Life in prison
Air Conditioner John used his employer’s credit 3.3 years without possi-
Fraud card to pay $80 for four new tires bility of parole
without permission. He pled
guilty to felony fraud. A few
years later, John forged a check
for $28.36 to pay rent at a hotel,
another felony. On a hot August
day, John, now 30 years old, is in
a bar and offers to fix the AC
unit, which he claims needs a
new compressor, for $120.75. The
owner gives him the money, but
John never returns.
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APPENDIX D
SENTENCES FOR STUDY 2B’S SEVEN “LOW
DISILLUSIONMENT” CASES
(for text of scenarios, see Appendix A)
Average punishment Average punishment
imposed by subjects in imposed by courts as
Title Study 2b reported to subjects
1. Umbrella Mistake 4 days No liability
2. Wolf Hallucination 7 days 3 months, 10 days
3. Clock Radio from Car 11 months 5 months, 2 days
4. Slap and Bruising at Record Store 19 months 12 months
5. Attempted Robbery at Gas Station 5.7 years 5 years
6. Mauling by Pit Bulls 17.7 years 15 years
7. Ambush Shooting 41 years Life
